Vietnam

Redazione published in Politics and strategy, Vietnam

In Vietnam, here is “the era of national ascendancy”

Hanoi approaches the 2026 Communist Party Congress with a very ambitious program

By Francesco Mattogno

According to the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), To Lam, Vietnam is about to enter “the era of national ascendancy,” defined as a “new historical starting point” that will transform Vietnam's role and relevance within the international order in the years to come. He had first spoken about this in front of his party colleagues last August 13, ten days after his inauguration as CPV secretary-general, repeating himself thereafter in public speeches, official communiqués and as part of various diplomatic meetings.

In the secretary-general's theory-approved in September by the party's Central Committee, which then made it an official doctrine-Vietnam's modern history can be divided into three periods: the era of independence and socialism (1930-1975), the era of reunification and Doi Moi reforms (1975-2025), and the era of national ascendancy, precisely, which will start with the 14th CPV Congress in 2026 and end in 2045.

As written by analyst Phan Xuan Dung in Fulcrum, the periodization presented by Lam supports a narrative of linear progression toward greater strength and prosperity for Vietnam, which fought two wars in the 20th century to free itself from Western colonialism before embarking on a path of continued growth. Today, however, says Lam referring to various international crises and the advancement of new technologies, the world is in a phase of “era-defining changes,” for which Vietnam should not be unprepared.

The CPV leader then described the years from 2024 to 2030 as a decisive “sprint period” that will prove crucial in establishing the shape of the new international order. There is no time to waste, in short. That is why in recent months Hanoi has begun to make several radical policy decisions that will serve to shape the “new era,” accelerating the implementation of many infrastructure projects that have sometimes been on hold for decades (such as the construction of high-speed railways or new nuclear power plants) and, most importantly, reforming much of the country's bureaucratic system.

The massive bureaucratic restructuring sought by Lam in recent months has led to the closure of five ministries and other government agencies and departments, whose responsibilities have been merged within existing institutions and departments. After years of gradual adjustments, the police apparatus has been further centralized through the removal of district-level departments, while the country's second largest television network (VTC) has been shut down, leaving more than 800 employees at home as part of a more general downsizing of the information sector.

The official goal of the reforms is to reduce bureaucracy and cut costs, on balance improving government efficiency. After the significant +7.09 percent recorded in 2024, Hanoi has set an ambitious GDP growth target for 2025 between 8 percent and 10 percent, with a broader double-digit growth target for 2026-2030. According to experts, such as Alexander Vuving, who wrote about it in the Diplomat, the Vietnamese leadership knows that to secure such growth, the economy will need to be driven by the technology sector and guided by a lean and competent public administration.

In December, for the first time after decades in which the issue had always been approached somewhat tentatively, the CPV Politburo made a political commitment to define “science, technology, innovation and digital transformation” as the cornerstones of the country's economic development. At the same time, Lam, as secretary general, was appointed to head the Central Directive Commission for the Development of Science, Technology, Innovation and Digital Transformation, and it was decided that the government should allocate at least 3 percent of the annual budget for this purpose.

In recent years, benefiting from the technology and trade clashes between Beijing and Washington, Vietnam had already turned into a welcome destination for multinational technology companies (mainly American) interested in relocating production from China. With rare exceptions, however, Vietnamese manufacturing in the new technology sector has almost always been limited to the employment of low-skilled workers, proving unaccustomed to innovation (it is no secret that the country lacks engineers, for example). Lam is trying to change this paradigm. 

Before becoming secretary (passing through an interim period as chairman) Lam was for years the minister of public security in charge of leading the anti-corruption campaign, which he used to work his way through the CPV, purging enemies and political opponents. Today, by Lam's hand, six out of 15 members of the party's Politburo come from the security apparatus, while the Ministry of Public Security itself has taken over many of the functions of the ministries and departments just cut by bureaucratic restructuring. And it is in this centralization of power that probably lies the other goal of Lam's doctrine of the new era.

Presenting the coming years as the decisive ones for the “rise” (vươn mình) of Vietnam is also a way to legitimize his mandate, leveraging a sense of urgency to justify rapid and radical changes. At a watershed moment in history, Lam can thus portray himself as the architect of epochal change, which does not, however, appear to bring about changes regarding Hanoi's international posture, which remains set on Trong's bamboo diplomacy. Perhaps more than others, Vietnam embodies the region's diplomatic balancing act, being able to maintain excellent relations simultaneously with Russia, China, and the United States.

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Redazione published in Economy and trade, Vietnam

Le Connector Economies – Il Vietnam

Hanoi è riuscita a ritagliarsi un ruolo fondamentale per l’economia globale, sfruttando la sua posizione unica tra Cina, Sud-Est asiatico e Occidente

By Francesca Leva

Nell’attuale momento di frammentazione geopolitica, siamo portati a concepire gli assetti economici in un’ottica binaria e mutualmente esclusiva: o alleati di Pechino, o alleati di Washington. In questo contesto, uno Stato che intrattiene rapporti economici con uno che segue una traiettoria politica divergente, è uno stato a rischio. 

Non deve essere necessariamente così. Vi sono infatti Paesi che sono stati negli ultimi anni in grado di navigare le fratture geopolitiche e beneficiare della possibilità di commerciare con plurimi partners: questo approccio li ha anzi resi resilienti vis-a ’-vis le ostilità politiche e commerciali, rendendoli beneficiari di flussi di investimenti diversificati. Questi Paesi vengono chiamati “connector economies”, e tra i più prominenti figurano Vietnam, Indonesia, Polonia, Messico e Marocco. Le connector economies a loro volta si suddividono lungo due linee: “connectors” tra diversi Paesi – quali il Vietnam, che si posiziona come interlocutore sia di Cina che di Stati Uniti – e connettori tra diversi tipi di transazioni economiche – il Messico -. 

Il successo delle connector economies in un periodo così turbolento sta nella capacità mantenere una politica estera bilanciata rispetto alle politiche di friendshoring e reshoring cinesi e statunitensi, al contempo sviluppando le capacità economiche e le infrastrutture necessarie per attrarre investimenti di tipo greenfield, beni e servizi e tradurli in capacità di export. Gli allineamenti geopolitici hanno infatti fortemente contribuito alla riconfigurazione dei flussi di investimenti globali: nel 2000 gli FDI – foreign direct investments, o IDE – contribuivano al 3,3% del PIL globale, negli ultimi cinque anni solo al 1,3%. In termini assoluti, gli investimenti diretti esteri sono aumentati modestamente: nel 2023 i flussi globali di IDE hanno raggiunto un valore stimato di 1,3 trilioni di dollari, il 3% in più rispetto al 2022. La frenata degli IDE ha però colpito in modo sproporzionato i paesi emergenti e in via di sviluppo: flussi di IDE verso i paesi sviluppati sono aumentati del 29%, raggiungendo i 524 miliardi di dollari, mentre i flussi verso i paesi in via di sviluppo sono diminuiti del 9%, arrivando a 841 miliardi di dollari. A titolo esemplificativo, tra il 2019 e il 2023, gli FDI dagli Stati Uniti verso la Cina sono scesi da una quota del 5,2% del totale, al 1,8%. Al contrario, le quote di FDI statunitensi verso paesi più allineati dal punto di vista geopolitico sono aumentate: di quattro punti percentuali verso l’India; di 3,4 punti percentuali verso gli Emirati Arabi Uniti; di 2,2 punti percentuali verso il Messico; e di circa un punto percentuale verso diversi Paesi del Sud-Est asiatico come la Malaysia, le Filippine e il Vietnam. Similmente, anche gli FDI provenienti dalla Cina verso i Paesi occidentali sono diminuiti da un picco di 196 miliardi di dollari – 1,9% del PIL – nel 2016 a 146 miliardi di dollari – 0,8% del PIL – nel 2022 e hanno sempre maggiormente favorito le nazioni Asiatiche e sud-est Asiatiche, peraltro beneficiarie degli investimenti facenti capo alla Belt and Road Initiative. 

In questo contesto di riconfigurazione dei rapporti commerciali, basti pensare che le connector economies rappresentano il 4% del prodotto interno lordo globale, eppure hanno attratto più del 10%, ovvero 550 miliardi di dollari, di tutti gli investimenti greenfield dal 2017. Se è vero che questo ci permette di guardare al decoupling tra Pechino e Washington sotto una nuova ottica, è altresì vero che l’allungamento e la frammentazione delle supply chains porterà comunque a un aumento dei costi dei beni e a una continua inflazione, con un impatto maggiore sui Paesi più poveri.

In questo contesto, il Vietnam è un esempio virtuoso di come un Paese sia stato in grado di posizionarsi strategicamente in un’area caratterizzata da intensa competizione economica, dispute territoriali, nonché la presenza di un vicino con un enorme leverage politico ed economico, la Cina. Già destinazione di numerosi investimenti globali nell’ambito della China Plus One Strategy – sviluppata nei primi anni 2000 dai Paesi minacciati dai competitivi costi del lavoro cinesi e volta alla diversificazione delle strutture delle supply chains globali -, nel 2023 Hanoi ha accolto $8.2 miliardi di investimenti dalla Cina e $500 milioni dagli Stati Uniti, principalmente nel settore dell’elettronica. Attualmente, gli Stati Uniti sono la destinazione di circa un terzo delle esportazioni del Vietnam, mentre la Cina è anche il principale partner commerciale del Vietnam, e il commercio bilaterale è caratterizzato da una vasta gamma di beni, tra cui elettronica, macchinari, tessuti e prodotti agricoli. Il commercio tra Vietnam e Cina nel primo semestre del 2024 ha raggiunto i 123 miliardi di dollari, con 77 miliardi di dollari di esportazioni dalla Cina e 46 miliardi di dollari importati dal Vietnam verso il continente cinese. Il Vietnam commercia con gli Stati Uniti nell’ambito di una Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, stipulata proprio nel 2023, e con la Cina nell’ambito dell’RCEP e dell’ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement.

Il rapporto commerciale molto stretto tra Hanoi e Pechino potrebbe tuttavia portare al deterioramento dell’economia locale, che si protegge invece tramite tre principali strategie. In primo luogo, il Vietnam è in grado di salvaguardare il sistema di produzione nazionale grazie alle rules of origins che impongono che, se il 30% o più del valore di un bene è generato  localmente, deve essere etichettato come “Made in Vietnam”. In secondo luogo, il Vietnam intrattiene forti relazioni commerciali con vari partners: se la Cina rappresenta infatti il 39% degli import di materiali elettronici del Vietnam – che si traducono in un 30% degli import statunitensi nello stesso settore -, Pechino pesa solo per il 33.21% sugli import totali del Paese, che ha infatti forti partnerships commerciali anche con Corea del Sud, Giappone e Taiwan. Infine, Hanoi è in grado di posizionarsi come partner commerciale internazionale non unicamente focalizzato sulla manifattura a basso costo, ma altresì sull’attrazione di investimenti e lo sviluppo di servizi ed industrie ad alto valore aggiunto. Esempi recenti includono l’adesione di Hanoi alla Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”) e all’ EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”).

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Redazione published in Economy and trade, Vietnam

Coffee prices are on the rise in Vietnam

Amid a supply shortfall, financial speculations and an increase in demand for Robusta beans, Vietnamese coffee prices are surging.

By Anna Affranio

Vietnam has very quickly become one of the world's leading producers of coffee. This product, massively consumed around the globe, was introduced to Vietnam as early as 1857 by some French priests during the colonial period, first in the northern provinces, and then later in the central and southern highlands. The soil and climatic conditions soon proved ideal for the cultivation of the robusta and arabica varieties, to the point that over time the country has gained a relevant position among the world's largest coffee producers (second largest exporter by volume after Brazil). This has been possible in recent decades thanks to large investments that followed the liberalization of land tenure with the Đổi Mới reforms in the mid-1980s, and World Bank/IMF policy recommendations incentivizing farmers to produce coffee for export. During this period, Vietnam specialized in producing beans of the Robusta variety, of which it is also the world's largest producer and which makes up almost all of the coffee produced in the country. 

But something is changing in the coffee market, in Vietnam and around the world. According to a recent report by the International Coffee Organization, in April prices of the Robusta species reached their highest levels in 45 years. What are the reasons for such a drastic increase in prices? The causes are mainly to be ascribed to the imbalance between supply and demand.

Currently, Robusta beans account for less than 30 percent of the world's coffee production, compared to the Arabica variety, which is much more in demand because of its softer taste and lower amount of caffeine. In contrast, the Robusta quality has a stronger, more bitter flavor and is easier to produce because, as the name suggests, it is more resistant to pests and is better adapted to different climatic and geographical conditions. These beans are usually used in espresso blends to add strength and body to the cup, but they are also widely used in instant coffees due to their convenience and consistent flavor profile. In fact, demand for the Robusta species is higher than ever, given their greater resilience to climate change than Arabica. In addition, rising transportation and fuel costs are pushing major European and U.S. companies to switch from the high-end Arabica variety, produced mainly in Central and South America, to the more affordable Robusta.The higher demand is thus inevitably driving up their price.

But back to Vietnam. Here, supply is contracting sharply due to a reduction in coffee-growing areas. In fact, local farmers are gradually replacing coffee cultivation with that of durian, the strong-smelling fruit much loved on the Asian continent. In particular, China has increased its demand for durian, and production of this fruit is proving more profitable for many farmers than coffee. It does not help that to comply with Chinese durian export requirements, which prevent durian from being grown with other plants, farmers are also cutting down existing coffee trees within mixed coffee-durian plantations. In addition, this particularly hot and dry season has not been conducive to an abundant harvest of beans.

Last but not least, it should be noted that coffee is one of the favorite commodities (along with oil and gold) for financial speculation, and the changing geopolitical, environmental, and climatic conditions provide fertile ground for wide volatility in coffee futures, thus further increasing prices.

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Lorenzo published in Politics and strategy, Vietnam

Vietnam, farewell to Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong

The general secretary of the Communist Party was in his third term. Inflexible internally, protagonist of the ruthless anti-corruption campaign of the "fiery furnace", flexible on the international level in accordance with its bamboo diplomacy which guaranteed Hanoi's recent success

By Lorenzo Lamperti

Born into a peasant family under French colonization and Japanese domination. Grew up during the war against the United States. Student of historical sciences in the Soviet Union. Editor of the Party's theoretical magazine, then its ideologist and finally undisputed leader. Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party whose death was announced yesterday, was not a figure like any other. Neither for Vietnam, nor for Asia. And, increasingly, it wasn't for the world either. Over the past ten months, Joe Biden, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have appeared alongside him in series. No other world leader can say the same. All this while the various Amazon, Apple, Samsung and BYD are competing to gain space in what is becoming a high-quality production hub, a crucial hub of globalization amid the turbulence of the dispute between the USA and China.

Trong led Vietnam through the elements, riding the waves instead of suffering them. While the ruthless "fiery furnace" anti-corruption campaign operated internally, it extolled bamboo diplomacy externally. Internal inflexibility, also or above all useful for getting rid of political rivals, was therefore accompanied by great flexibility on the international scene. As a convinced Marxist-Leninist, Trong has cultivated the historical-ideological bond with Beijing, preserving the security link with Russia. And starting a historic thaw with Washington with his historic trip to the White House in 2015, the first for a Vietnamese leader. A useful move to diversify international relations and add further stability protection for a country with a jagged and violent history. Almost a thousand years of Chinese domination first, then the "hot" effects of the Cold War with American bombs.

Pessimistic rumors have been circulating about the health of Trong, 80, for some time. Already a few years ago there was talk of a "heart attack". In recent months he had missed at least two important appointments: the meeting with Indonesian president Joko Widodo, who was traveling to Hanoi, and the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the victory in the war against France. He then reappeared a month ago to welcome Putin. But the images next to the Russian leader showed him in less than reassuring conditions, so much so that they were not circulated in state media. In recent days, there was a transfer of power to President To Lam, a figure who in the Vietnamese system has mainly ceremonial functions. The signal of the seriousness of the disease came with the awarding of the Order of the Gold Star, generally awarded posthumously. Then, the official announcement.

His health had been questioned since 2021, when at the XII Party Congress he obtained an unprecedented third mandate, a year ahead of his Chinese "colleague" Xi Jinping. The recent history of Hanoi and Beijing, as well as the experiences of Trong and Xi, have often traveled in parallel. While Deng Xiaoping launched the Chinese reform and opening up, Le Duan in Vietnam prepared the Doi Moi to open the Vietnamese socialist economy to the market. Trong became general secretary in 2011, a year before Xi. Again like the Chinese president, Trong has built his reputation on ostentatious inflexibility in matters of security and incorruptibility, a medal he used to defeat his rival Nguyen Tan Dung at the 2016 Congress. A victory of ideology on the market, it was said At that time. But Hanoi then signed free trade agreements with the European Union and the United Kingdom, promoting RCEP in the Asia-Pacific. The pressure on Washington to obtain recognition as a market economy seems close to producing the desired result, with Hanoi having now made itself indispensable for the diversification of global supply chains and has significantly raised its production standards.

And it matters little if behind the scenes the political conflict continued even after the start of Trong's third term. In the space of a year, the general secretary got rid of two presidents. First Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who aspired to take his place, then Vo Van Thuong, considered his dolphin. In total, eight Politburo members were expelled within a few years. We are now expected to convene a central committee to appoint an interim general secretary. In addition to President To Lam, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, prime minister and former police general from the powerful Ministry of Public Security, is also in the running.

In any case, the nomination will be valid "only" until the XIV Congress in January 2026, when the final choice will be made. In Beijing, as in Washington and Moscow, they will carefully observe the solution to the puzzle of Trong's succession. But Vietnam intends to continue with conviction on the path of neutrality in foreign policy and economic development through openness to the world.

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Redazione published in Economy and trade, Vietnam

VinFast's ambitious mission

The first all-Vietnamese automaker has big plans for the future. The competition is strong and there are many obstacles to overcome, but the company has been included by TIME among the most influential in the world

By Francesco Mattogno

Few even among Formula 1 fans remember the Hanoi circuit. Not because of the characteristics of the track, with a questionable layout, but because the Vietnam Grand Prix only existed on paper, or in the virtual world. The race, which should have debuted in 2020, was first postponed for a year due to the Covid pandemic and finally permanently removed from the Formula 1 calendar, despite a ten-year contract signed in 2018 (a decision also influenced by the anti-corruption campaign that hit some of the event organizers). Today anyone who wants can "race" in the Hanoi circuit only on the Formula 1 2020 video game, in which it had been inserted beforehand.

It would have been the second Grand Prix of the category in South-East Asia (after that of Singapore), but also the first major showcase for VinFast, a Vietnamese car manufacturer part of the Vingroup conglomerate. The announcement with great fanfare and the subsequent cancellation of the race, for which Vingroup would have been the main sponsor, fit perfectly into the path of ups and downs that has characterized the short history of VinFast up to now. The company was founded in 2017 by will of Pham Nhat Vuong, president, major shareholder and founder in 2002 of Vingroup itself, which within twenty years has become the largest private Vietnamese company thanks to the activities of its subsidiaries, operating mainly in real estate, technology and services sectors.

Vingroup's great growth has made Vuong the first billionaire in Vietnam's history and consequently one of the country's most prominent public figures, who is also believed to be very close to the leadership of the ruling Communist Party. A position of strength that pushed Vuong to invest in a hypercompetitive sector such as the automotive one, with the idea of ​​making VinFast a brand specialized in the production of electric vehicles. And also making it a matter of national pride.

Vingroup's plan was to make VinFast the first all-Vietnamese automaker, as the industry's other major brand, Truong Hai Auto Corporation (THACO), makes vehicles for large foreign companies such as BMW, Hyundai and Kia. It is no coincidence that the inauguration ceremony of the Haiphong production plant, still today the only VinFast factory in Vietnam, was organized on 2 September 2017, on the 72nd anniversary of the declaration of independence from France pronounced by Ho Chi Minh in 1945 .

VinFast started shipping its first cars to Vietnam in June 2019, two years after its founding, but only entered the electric vehicle market in 2022 (at first it mainly produced cars with combustion engines). 2022 is also the year in which Vuong kicked off the company's international expansion plan, which began to focus entirely on electric. Vingroup first signed a preliminary agreement worth two billion dollars with the US county of Chatham (North Carolina) for the construction of the first VinFast factory abroad, then it agreed with Intel to jointly develop technologies for autonomous driving of vehicles.

Also in 2022, another subsidiary of the conglomerate, VinES Energy Solution, started construction of an electric car battery factory together with China's Gotion High-Tech, in Vietnam's Ha Tinh province. VinES then merged with VinFast the following year. Vingroup's large investments laid the foundations for VinFast's stock market listing in the United States, on the Nasdaq, but they also hid a certain frenzy on the part of the group to make the company truly competitive in the electric sector.

In 2023 the company sold 34,855 electric cars, a figure much higher than that of 2022 (7,400) but still lower than the target of 50 thousand deliveries set by the company, which just last year began shipping cars, scooters and electric buses also outside Vietnam. Beyond the net losses, which in 2023 reached 2.39 billion dollars (+14.7% compared to 2022), what is especially worrying are the details. If it is true that VinFast delivered around 35 thousand vehicles in 2023, more than 72% of these were "sold" to Green and Smart Mobility (GSM), a subsidiary taxi company of Vingroup.

In the first days, VinFast's capitalization was the third highest among global car brands, behind only Tesla and Toyota, but as time passed the value of the Vietnamese company's shares collapsed by more than 95% compared to its peak initial. Analysts have spoken of a "meme title", inflated by the great interest aroused in it by the international media and social networks. On the other hand, even today the brand, despite the many negative reviews on its products, enjoys good press: for example, TIME has included VinFast in the list of the 100 most influential companies of 2024.

In recent months the Vietnamese company has found itself forced to withdraw hundreds of cars already delivered due to safety problems (such as faulty airbags) or the poor quality of components, as well as facing various legal disputes. In the United States, an investigation has been launched to ascertain the cause of the death of four people, including two children, due to the VF 8 they were traveling in crashing into a tree. The car, which also caught fire, may have had problems with its autonomous driving system. VinFast was then sued by AncelorMittal for the theft of intellectual property regarding some steel components used in its vehicles, while in April several investors sued the company, accusing it of artificially inflating the value of its shares on the Nasdaq.

Vista la situazione complicata, a gennaio Vuong ha preso le redini del progetto auto-nominandosi amministratore delegato dell’azienda, e diventando così il quarto CEO di VinFast negli ultimi tre anni. Nonostante i tanti intoppi, che avrebbero potuto suggerire un ridimensionamento di VinFast, Vingroup sembra invece intenzionata ad aumentare progressivamente obiettivi e investimenti. La casa ha dichiarato di voler arrivare a vendere 100 mila veicoli elettrici nel 2024, fissando poi una soglia di 750 mila consegne annuali entro il 2026.

To do this, in addition to large injections of liquidity (Vingroup and Vuong have invested more than 11 billion dollars in VinFast since 2017), the company has said it intends to expand into at least 50 international markets by the end of the year. In just a few months, VinFast has opened various offices in Europe and signed agreements for the sale of its cars in Ghana, Thailand, Micronesia and the Philippines, while it is strengthening its charging station infrastructure and planning the construction of two more production plants, in India and Indonesia, which would be added to that in the United States.

“VinFast is entering a highly competitive electric vehicle market, against established legacy brands and in the midst of a price war,” analyst Chris Robinson told the Nikkei. And this could be his biggest obstacle.

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Redazione published in Economy and trade, Vietnam

Vietnam journey towards wealth

The Southeast Asian country is one of those best positioned to increase its benesse

By Tommaso Magrini

Vietnam's growing geopolitical relevance is based on its strong economic performance as well as geography. When Vietnam began to open up in the mid-1980s, annual per capita income was half that of Kenya. Thanks to pragmatic and increasingly business-friendly policies, it has since grown six-fold to $3,700. Today, the government's ambition to turn Vietnam into a wealthy country by 2045 is plausible, the Economist argues. Economically, Vietnam has probably never faced a more favorable global environment. Geopolitics is driving investment toward this goal as America seeks to disengage from China and private companies of all nationalities sense the direction in which the wind is blowing. Most manufacturers simply cannot withdraw from China. But to mitigate the cost of current and future trade barriers, they can hedge their bets by doing things elsewhere as well (a strategy known as "China + 1"). Companies that export to the West are shifting production to Vietnam. Brands such as Samsung and Apple are making gadgets there. Around them are tightening suppliers, including Chinese ones. In the first three quarters of 2023, foreign direct investment inflows to Vietnam as a percentage of GDP were twice as large as to Indonesia, the Philippines or Thailand. According to the Economist, Vietnam's many young manufacturing workers are diligent, reasonably educated and cost half as much as those in China's coastal areas. Also good on the security front. Vietnam, unlike Indonesia and the Philippines, has no problems with Islamic terrorism. It also offers big incentives to foreign investors, starting with tax breaks, cheap land.

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Redazione published in Politics and strategy, Vietnam

Apple, another decisive step in Vietnam

Global technological giants are increasingly present in and around Hanoi

Article by Tommaso Magrini

Vietnam is preparing for a crucial development in its economic and technological ambitions. Apple is, in fact, allocating resources for iPad product development to the Southeast Asian country for the first time, an important step toward strengthening the Southeast Asian country’s position as an alternative manufacturing hub outside China. Apple is collaborating with China’s BYD, a leading iPad assembler, to move resources to Vietnam for new product introductions. This is the first time this happens for such a major Apple device. Engineering verification for trial production of an iPad model will begin in the middle of February next year, says Nikkei Asia. The model will be available in the second half of next year. BYD was also the first supplier to Apple to help the U.S. tech giant move iPad assembly to Vietnam for the first time in 2022. The move requires substantial resources both for the tech company and its suppliers, such as engineers and investment in lab equipment to test new features and functions. Most of Apple’s new product introduction is done in China, in collaboration with Cupertino engineers, to take advantage of the country’s decades of experience in hardware production. But the geopolitical uncertainties are forcing the company to rethink this approach. Apple also has plans to send some iPhone trials to India. Vietnam has emerged as Apple’s most important technology manufacturing hub outside of China. The Cupertino-based tech giant has asked suppliers to build new manufacturing capacity for almost all of its products except for iPhone, from AirPods to MacBooks, Apple Watch to iPads. Apple will continue to work closely with Chinese suppliers in its supply chain shift, but Vietnam is becoming increasingly central.

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Redazione published in Economy and trade, Vietnam

Foreign investment boom in Vietnam

Hanoi's role is also gradually strengthening on the electronics and high-quality technology front

By Tommaso Magrini

Vietnam continues to attract international interest. Foreign investment in the South-East Asian country soared in October, when the manufacturing hub attracted more than double the financial commitments received monthly this year, in a context of strong growth in expenditure on new plants. In October, Vietnam received foreign investment commitments worth $5.3 billion, against a monthly average of $2.2 billion in the rest of the year. About 90% of the inflows in October were driven by factory-building projects, according to data from the Vietnamese Investment Ministry. Since the beginning of the year, the country has received foreign investment commitments for 25.76 billion dollars, 14.7% more than the same period of the previous year. Manufacturing industry remains a stronghold of investment in Vietnam. In the first ten months of 2023, foreign companies invested nearly $18.84 billion in manufacturing projects, accounting for 73.1% of total FDI inflows in the same period. But the role of Vietnam is gradually strengthening also on the front of high-quality electronics and technology. Foreign investors are increasingly turning to Vietnam to diversify their supply chains.Some of the most recent examples include September 23, when Japanese technology company Kyocera Document Solutions announced plans to invest $237 million to expand its machine and equipment factory in Hai Phong. Commitments from mainland China and Hong Kong together were the highest this year, followed by Singapore and South Korea. The data show that actual investments in the first ten months of 2023 increased by 2.4% compared to the same period of the previous year, reaching 18 billion dollars.

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Redazione published in Politics and strategy, Vietnam

Italy and Vietnam strengthen ties

In recent days, Undersecretary Maria Tripodi has co-chaired the 8th Mixed Economic Commission between Rome and Hanoi

High-level diplomatic exchanges between Italy and Vietnam continue, in a particularly important year also at a symbolic level for bilateral relations, which in 2023 celebrate their first 50 (fruitful) years. On 25 October, in fact, Undersecretary Maria Tripodi co-chaired the Farnesina, together with the Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of Vietnam Nguyen Sinh Nhat Tan, the VIII Mixed Economic Commission, in the presence of ministries and representatives of the private sector. This year’s edition takes place in a very positive and constantly growing phase of collaboration with Vietnam, key partners in the Indo-Pacific region and in the ASEAN area. This year is not only the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations, but also the tenth anniversary of the strategic partnership between Italy and Vietnam. The work allowed to renew the commitment to strengthen the already excellent relations between the two countries, also in the light of the success of the state visit to Italy of the President of Vietnam, Vo Van Thuong, last July. Particular attention was given to the main sectors of common interest, including: trade and investment, industry, energy, environment, infrastructure, health, agriculture, science and technology, culture and tourism. Undersecretary Tripodi and Deputy Minister Tan have met next year in Hanoi for the IX edition of the Joint Economic Commission. The meeting was preceded by a brief bilateral meeting in which the opportunity was taken to promote Rome’s candidacy for EXPO2030. Italy and Vietnam are experiencing steady growth in bilateral trade. In 2022 there were 6.2 billion dollars of interchange, an increase of 11% compared to the previous year, with Vietnam which is currently the first trading partner of Italy in the ASEAN region, while Italy is one of Vietnam’s main partners in Europe. In the specific one, the exports of Vietnam towards Italy last year were at 4,4 billion dollars, an increase of 14% regarding the year precedence, and its imports from Italy were at 1,7 billion dollars, an increase of 3.6%. To date, Italy also occupies 33 places out of 143 countries and territories that invest directly in Vietnam, while Vietnam is one of the ten main destinations of Italian investment among developing countries. The bond seems destined only to strengthen.

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Redazione published in Culture and society, Vietnam

The Italian language in Vietnam

Busy schedule of events in Hanoi for Italian Language Week. Particularly significant edition given the 50th anniversary of bilateral relations

From October 14 to 20, the XXIII Italian Language Week in the World was celebrated in Hanoi, dedicated this year to the theme "Italian and Sustainability." The event, which is held under the High Patronage of the President of the Republic, had a rich program of events and initiatives aimed at promoting the knowledge and dissemination of Italian in Vietnam, organized in collaboration with the Department of Italian Studies at the University of Hanoi and Uni-Italia Vietnam. The official opening of the event was held on Monday, October 16. During the ceremony, Italian Ambassador to Vietnam Marco della Seta, Chancellor of Hanoi University Nguyen Van Trao and Director of the Department of Italianistics Pham Bich Ngoc spoke. Vietnamese media gave extensive coverage to the event. "There are few high schools in Vietnam that teach Italian. I hope in the coming time we will promote more high schools to teach this language," Ambassador Della Seta told Dan Tri. But Italy has planned support packages that will include scholarships for students, teaching materials and professional courses for teachers teaching Italian in Vietnam. The University of Hanoi currently has 500 students studying Italian and 50 Italian students studying in Vietnam.According to the Ambassador, the two countries still have a lot of room for development cooperation in this field. The previous 2019-2022 agreement on the education front is set to be further strengthened. According to Dan Tri, in the coming years, along with the transformation of the country's economy, the school and the Italian Language Department will continue to provide professional training geared to international standards. "It is hoped that in the future the Italian Language Department will continue to be supported by the Embassy and Italian government agencies in Hanoi in its professional activities, especially in carrying out the mission of dissemination and development of teaching and learning," said Rector Nguyen Van Trao. "Objective: to learn the Italian language, known as the language of love, in Vietnam."

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Annalisa Manzo published in Culture and society, Vietnam

On the wave of K-Pop: the influence of South Korean culture in Vietnam

Since Vietnam and South Korea established formal diplomatic relations in 1992, however, popular culture has proven to be Seoul's best ambassador to the Southeast Asian country

By Annalisa Manzo 

The so-called "Korean Wave"-hallyu in Korean-the increase in the global spread of South Korean culture has now reached all corners of the globe, and in Vietnam it extends to a wide range of sectors: entertainment, business, fashion and even soccer. Economic ties between the two countries run deep. South Korea has been the largest or second largest investor in Vietnam almost every year for more than a decade. Choi Bundo, president of the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Central and South Vietnam, told Nikkei Asia that tax and trade agreements have helped nurture economic ties between the two countries. In addition, high satisfaction with Vietnam's high-quality workforce and expectations that it can take over the role currently held by China-because of unstable U.S.-China relations-are equally important reasons why Korean companies choose Vietnam, Choi said.

Since Vietnam and South Korea established formal diplomatic relations in 1992, however, popular culture has proven to be Seoul's best ambassador to the Southeast Asian country. It all started in the late 1990s, when Korean TV series-so-called K-dramas-began to be broadcast on local television thanks to sponsors from some Korean companies, sparking public interest in pop music, K-pop and other Korean cultural exports such as movies, food, travel, fashion and cosmetics. Now, after more than two decades, this "Korean wave" continues to be very popular in Vietnam and throughout Southeast Asia.

Many scholars believe that this is partly the result of the Korean government's policy of promoting South Korea as "a dream economy of icons and aesthetic experience." The aesthetic traces of Korean pop culture in Vietnam are tangible. Images of Korean artists pervade public places, decorating billboards, department stores and beauty salons.

The popularity of all things Korean-food, cell phones, and cosmetics brands in particular-reflects a general attitude that sees South Korea as a modern and intriguing culture. Although the Vietnamese are also very open to Western culture, underlying cultural differences remain. In contrast, South Korea turns out to be a closer model of Asian modernity, the development of which thus seems more within the reach of the Vietnamese public. After all, South Korea's miraculous economic growth is quite recent, and Korea shares clear cultural similarities with Vietnam, including a Confucian cultural heritage, an emphasis on family ties and respect for elders, and a collectivist value that emphasizes conformity.

Many Vietnamese see in the metropolitan and glamorous lifestyles embodied by Korean stars on screens an alluring and desirable future. The success stories put forth by K-dramas serve as an inspiration to reflect on one's life and strive for success. The portrayal of the tireless pursuit of status and money by K-drama characters resonates with many Vietnamese viewers who are encouraged to be self-sufficient by the Vietnamese government's recent neoliberal social policy. Decades after the 1986 Doi Moi ("renewal"), marked by Vietnam's transition to a market economy and integration into global trade, the government has transferred some welfare responsibilities to the market and now promotes self-generated wealth and success as patriotism. In addition, some have noted that the dominance of South Korean pop culture in Vietnam is joining recent socio-cultural developments in the country. Romantic K-dramas and sentimental K-pop ballads, which emphasize pure and ideal romantic love, self-love, and self-awareness, have touched the chords of a changing Vietnamese society, which is bringing in its media a turn toward the ordinary and private.

In the spread of Korean pop culture, K-pop music plays a predominant role. From a local trend to a global phenomenon, K-pop has spread worldwide since the early 2000s, starting in the Japanese music market and spreading to East Asian countries until the mid-2010s. Notably, 2012 saw the genre make its debut in the global music industry. Indeed, in the summer of 2012 Psy set unprecedented records on the music charts, gaining international fame with his mega hit "Gangnam Style." Later, the word "K-pop" was included in the Oxford English Dictionary to designate "Korean pop music."

A decade has passed and K-pop is no longer considered just a regional music genre that has temporarily captured the attention of a global audience. It has taken root as an important subcultural genre and is gaining prominence on the international stage as a new standard for the industry. One of the key defining factors of K-pop, and one that continues to show the growth potential of this genre, is its receptivity to change and new sources. Indeed, it has shown exceptional vigilance in adapting and using technological advances to develop a highly profitable business model. Just as the recent concert by the world-famous South Korean girl group Blackpink demonstrated, one of the many ways in which South Korean influence has swept the country. The superstar concert gave Vietnam its biggest dose of K-pop to date, much to the delight of the rapidly growing local fandom.

According to data from the Korea Foundation, which conducts annual hallyu surveys around the world, Vietnam had 13.3 million fans of the culture in 2022, the third highest in the world, after China and Thailand.

The price of tickets did not help deter fans, even though the average monthly salary of a Vietnamese worker is around seven million dong, although the number of wealthy Vietnamese increased 110 percent from 2016 to 2021, the fourth highest growth in Asia, reports the Knight Frank Wealth Report.

The cheapest tickets started from 1.2 million ($68.30) up to 9.8 million Vietnamese dong for VIP seats. On the morning of the second concert on July 30, local media reported that some VIP tickets were being sold for up to 30 million dong each. As the last stop in Asia of their ongoing world tour, demand has been high since the dates were released. Some 67,000 spectators packed My Dinh Stadium for what industry insiders described as the "biggest music event" ever held in Vietnam.

Tran Tuan Tai, professor of finance at Massey University of New Zealand, noted that the cost of tickets in Vietnam, relative to GDP per capita, was the highest among the other Born Pink World Tour stops. Interestingly, the most expensive ticket in Vietnam - amounting to 9.8 million dong - was higher than a similar ticket in other countries such as Indonesia (3.8 million rupees - $335) and Singapore ($398), both of which have higher GDP per capita than Vietnam. According to Tai, fueling demand in Vietnam is the fact that the country is usually not a common destination for global music shows; the most popular Southeast Asian destinations remain Thailand and Singapore. Vietnam, with a population of 100 million, has a large and growing middle class that is eager to spend on cultural and entertainment activities such as K-pop concerts, Tai added. According to the World Data Lab, Vietnam's middle class population is estimated to be one of the fastest growing populations in the world between 2020 and 2030. "Paying high prices for concert tickets does not mean that Vietnamese people are rich, but rather underscores their willingness to spend," said Nguyen Cuong Bach, managing director of tourism-focused marketing agency Asia Lion. "This shows a more mature entertainment tourism market in Vietnam."

The two Blackpink concerts had a very positive impact on Vietnam's economy. The Hanoi Department of Tourism said the city received 170,000 visitors during the two days of the shows, including 30,000 foreigners. In all, they spent about 630 billion dong. The average hotel occupancy rate in Hanoi in July was estimated at 60.8 percent, an increase of 19.2 percent compared to July 2022. The number of visitors to Hanoi tourist destinations on the weekend of July 29-30 also increased by 15 to 20 percent compared with the previous weekend. In the weeks before and immediately after the concerts, a significant increase in bookings by South Korean and Chinese visitors was observed for cruises in Ha Long Bay, a UNESCO World Heritage site about 160 kilometers from Hanoi.

After Blackpink's performance, Tran Sy Thanh, chairman of the Hanoi People's Committee, sent a letter of thanks to the band, noting that their concerts had enhanced Hanoi's image and standing as a peaceful, safe and friendly destination. 

Lang Minh, professor of media and digital literacy and educational consultant at MindX, said the Vietnamese government's approach to the culture industry is a way to exercise "soft power"-the ability to influence others through non-coercive means. "Vietnam suffers from enormous horizontal pressures from surrounding countries with rapidly developing cultural industries, Thailand, South Korea, China and Japan. This pushes Vietnam to pay attention to improving its cultural industry, not only to earn money but also to emphasize its national values." Thus, some opinions are gaining ground that Vietnam wants to take advantage of the popularity of K-pop to leverage economic benefits-both soft and hard-with South Korea, one of its most important trading partners. Last December, the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Vietnam was transformed into a comprehensive strategic partnership. Riding the hallyu wave, the two countries are ready to write a new future.

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Redazione published in Politics and strategy, Vietnam

The significance of the US-Vietnam partnership

Scenarios and prospects on Washington-Hanoi relations after President Joe Biden's recent visit

By Tommaso Magrini

US President Joe Biden visited Vietnam on Sunday 10 September. ‘The strengthening of the Us-Vietnam partnership will partly redress the swing in the regional balance in South-East Asia and the South China Sea towards China that has occurred over the past decade’. This was argued in an analysis published in Nikkei Asia by Alexander L. Vuving of the Daniel K.Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu and an expert mainly on Vietnamese foreign policy. Besides being a significant addition to the regional architecture, the elevated US-Vietnam partnership will be a critical component of Vietnam’s international ‘safety net’, Vuving argues. The thicker threads of this network include special strategic relationships with Laos and Cambodia ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with China, Russia, India and South Korea- and in the process of being defined with Australia and Singapore- and a ‘broad strategic partnership’ with Japan. But although the United States, like China, is regarded by Hanoi as an ‘indispensable nation’ in the Asia-Pacific region, Vuving emphasizes that so far it has been at the third level of Vietnam’s foreign relations as a mere ‘global partner’. According to Vuving, Vietnam must avoid taking sides in the rivalry between great powers, but must adhere to or even create mechanisms that promote its sovereignty, territorial integrity, prosperity and resilience. While maintaining the bilateral and multilateral relations it has cultivated in the past, it should not avoid participating in extemporaneous ‘mini-lateral’ groupings that could contribute to the country’s defence and development. There was also much talk of business and technology during the US President’s visit. Leading US semiconductor and digital product companies, including Intel, GlobalFoundries and Google, participated in a business meeting with the purpose of strengthening Vietnam’s global role in various segments of chip production.

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