Global Lens

The leaders of the two blocs meet in Brussels to celebrate the partnership and find new spaces for cooperation

By Chiara Suprani

The 14th of December 2022, the heads of state and national leaders of the ASEAN bloc countries and the European Union will meet in Brussels for the first time, to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the formalization of the bilateral partnership, elevated to "strategic partnership" as reported by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell in a speech of August 4th 2022. All the heads of state will be present, with the exception of the Burmese leaders, while the response of the freshly appointed Malaysian Prime Minister is still awaited. In view of the events that have characterized recent years, the occasion, preceded by two meetings on December 13th, the Youth Summit and the tenth EU-ASEAN Business Summit, is of great importance. Given the international climate, security will be one of the key themes of the event. Brussels could try to get a clearer position from the ASEAN countries on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in order to receive more guarantees on compliance with EU sanctions imposed on Russia. The event, co-chaired by Cambodia, which holds the ASEAN presidency until the end of the year, will address key issues in the bilateral relationship between ASEAN and European countries such as trade and sustainability, renewable energy, investment and connectivity. Some of these key junctions have already been preceded by bilateral agreements between member countries such as the "Partnership for Sustainability" between Sweden and Indonesia. Jakarta, which will hold the ASEAN presidency for 2023, has gone through 11 rounds of negotiations to draft a free trade agreement with the EU, which has not been reached yet. According to The Diplomat, the EU should aim for a negotiated compromise with Indonesia, in order to get the latter to sign the treaty, a compromise similar to the one granted to Vietnam and Singapore, countries with which it closed negotiations by also lowering development and ecological standards. However, on December 6th, Brussels passed a new law to prevent the import of goods responsible for deforestation. The law has been strongly criticized by Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Among these products there are: coffee, soya and palm oil, crops that in 2020 recorded exports of 2, 17 and 27 billion US dollars respectively. According to Nikkei Asia, the EU at the 45th Anniversary Summit will encourage Southeast Asia to assume important roles in global supply chains, following the logic of the "friend-shoring". The neologism of the "friend-shoring" takes up the idea of the previous on-shoring and off-shoring, but linking the relocation in countries that are considered friends. Additionally, ASEAN and the EU signed a new level of connectivity cooperation in October with the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (CATA AE), the world’s first agreement of this kind. The agreement not only benefits travellers with direct access to new destinations, but also calls for a greater level of coordination, managerial as well, between ASEAN countries. With 2023 just around the corner, a general easing of the pandemic containment measures, and the signing of the CATA, there are conditions for new business opportunities for European companies, which guarantee fair and transparent market conditions. Finding the right channel of communication between interests, needs and sustainable standards could be one of the hot spots of the December 14th dialogue. Yet, between the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian-Ukrainian war, amid slowdowns in supply chains, the strategic export bans of individual member states to prevent further economic crises the perceptions of the bilateral relationship appear to be positive. According to the EU-ASEAN Business Sentiment Survey, the Southeast Asian region is considered first for better economic opportunities in the next 5 years. Not only that, in general all the prospects for trade and investment have obtained in the survey positive growth expectations. In conclusion, on the 14th December, many eyes will turn to Brussels and the still untapped potential of the ASEAN-EU bilateral relationship.

The Bali summit concluded with a joint statement expressing unease over the war in Ukraine. And it showed the first signs of a thaw between the West and China

Now we can say it. The G20 summit in Bali was a success. The Indonesian rotating presidency had to deal with the most complicated year in recent times. With the world still grappling with the tail end of the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine further complicated the plans of world economies. Not only that, it has also exacerbated the climate between Russia and the West, but also between the United States and China. With these premises, the risk that the summit would turn out to be a flop was high. Instead, it did not. It is true that the discussion was largely dominated by conflict, but it is equally true that everyone present was ready and willing to engage in dialogue. After the preamble of the bilateral between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, it kind of all came cascading down, with the Chinese president meeting with all the various European leaders. The Indonesian rotating presidency secured the signing of a joint statement in which leaders of the major economies hoped for cooperation to address the various challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic and exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, pledging to provide necessary support to the world's most vulnerable countries. Jakarta celebrated three "concrete outcomes" of the summit. The first: the creation of a health fund, which will help countries prepare for future pandemics. The fund has received pledges totaling $1.5 billion from member countries and international organizations. The second, welcomed by the entire ASEAN bloc: the creation of a trust fund to help low-income, small states and vulnerable middle-income countries deal with macroeconomic problems, including those caused by pandemic and climate change. The third, more domestic: the commitment of $20 billion in public and private funding from the United States and Japan over the next five years to help Indonesia accelerate its transition to renewable energy. The final declaration marks an important step of cooperation by the entire G20, including China and India, and perhaps opens a window of dialogue with Russia, which welcomed the "balance" of the summit's conclusions. Southeast Asia is confirmed as an indispensable platform for advancing global diplomacy.

Acronyms for policies in the Indo-Pacific are multiplying. But as China and the United States seek to consolidate their influence in Asia, countries on the continent try to shield themselves from the consequences of this antagonism by setting up bilateral agreements that help maintain a certain degree of interoperability without being forced to openly take the side of one or the other power

Article by Lucrezia Goldin

Either with me, or against me. Unless we find a third way to consolidate defense. In the increasingly polarized competition between China and the United States, bilateral security relations are growing between several Asian countries, which, with an approach made up of individual military cooperation agreements, are trying to free themselves from the magnetism of Washington and Beijing, exploiting regional interoperability as the key to independence from the two powers. An approach that, operating without clamor and without obvious anti-China or anti-US aims (as some multilateral initiatives such as Quad and Aukus on the Chinese side and the Global Security Initiative on the US side are perceived to be), takes the form of an alternative architecture that allows Asian countries to equip themselves with deterrence tools without the risk of annoying the two powers.

From Japan to South Korea, via Singapore and the Philippines, bilateral exchanges on security technology and defense equipment show an Asia that would rather not get caught in the crossfire of high-sounding acronyms between China and the United States. A move to the rear made up of apparently second-rate but strategic agreements, especially if conceived as an instrument of long-term independence from the viewpoint of the large antagonistic blocs.  

The undisputed leader of this trend is Japan. For several years, Tokyo has been trying to revive its defense industry, and to do so, it is intensifying its relations with several South-East Asian countries. As early as 2016, Japan and the Philippines signed a defense agreement, whereby Tokyo pledged to supply security equipment and technology to Manila. Under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte then, an update to the same agreement in the summer of 2020 led to the sale of radar control systems from Mitsubishi Electric to the Philippine government, marking the first sale of fully Japanese-made defense technology to a Southeast Asian country. With Malaysia, on the other hand, there is the Japan-Malaysia Defence Pact of 2018, while on relations with Indonesia and Vietnam, former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga's focus has led to the signing of two agreements for the transfer of defense equipment and technology (in March and September 2021 respectively). Even trying not to draw too much international political attention with these agreements, Tokyo's stated aim is to promote its vision of a 'free and open' Indo-Pacific. This vision was also confirmed by Defence Minister Kishi Nobuo last September during a visit to Hanoi, in which he spoke of cooperation with Vietnam as being aimed at 'contributing to peace and stability in the region and the international community as a whole'.

On this front, the new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is also wasting no time. Last May, the Japanese Prime Minister and his Thai counterpart Prayut Chan-o-cha signed an agreement for the transfer of military equipment to Thailand, which was shortly followed by the Japanese government's announcement that it would reform its regulations on the export of military equipment so as to allow the export of missiles and fighter jets to 12 countries including India, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Australia from 2023. Also with Singapore, as announced during a meeting on the sidelines of the Asian security summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, negotiations will soon begin to reach an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, which also includes the areas of cyber security and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRNE) explosive weapons. An enhanced Defense Exchange Memorandum, signed by the respective Defense Ministers Kishi Nobuo and Ng Eng Hene, complements the one signed between the two countries in 2009. The aim: to move towards 'more concrete security cooperation'. Less talk, more agreements. Without China and the USA in the way.

Active participation also on the part of India, which with the India Act East Policy created platforms for dialogue and joint maritime exercises with Singapore and Thailand, the SIMBEX and SITMEX, with the aim of maintaining regional security. To the Philippines, New Delhi provided its Brahmos missile systems and arranged for the movement of several ships of India's Eastern Command to facilitate bilateral exercises with the Philippine Navy. Dialogue with Vietnam has also been productive and free of US or Chinese interference. In 2016, a $500 million line of credit was established between Hanoi and New Delhi for the purchase of new defense platforms, and today most Vietnamese pilots are trained at Indian training bases in exchange for access to naval and air bases in Cham Ranh Bay. Finally, with Thailand, India shares maritime objectives related to issues such as illegal fishing, drug trafficking, smuggling, and piracy, confirming an interoperability that remains strong between the two countries both because of their historical and cultural backgrounds and because of their common interests related to the maritime border in the Andaman Sea, a key access point for trade in the Strait of Malacca.

South Korea has also given signs that it wants to join this 'behind-the-scenes' strategy. The Moon Jae-in administration had started to intensify relations with India and ASEAN countries through the New Southern Policy of 2017, but failed to materialize many agreements and cooperation independent of existing security platforms. The case of the Indonesian non-participation in the realization of the new Kf-X/IF-X fighters is an example of this. After a defense agreement between South Korea and Indonesia concluded in 2013, the two countries "encountered several complications" in the joint realization of new equipment, but to date they maintain good relations and at the presentation of the new 2021 Korean KF-X fighters, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto had also been invited. Also as part of the Shangri-La Dialogue sideline meetings, on the other hand, Singapore and South Korea updated their Memorandum of Understanding on defense cooperation, adding cybersecurity and maritime cooperation as collaboration priorities.

Asia is also moving without China and the United States, aware that excessive dependence on either side in security matters can prove counterproductive. For existing disputes with Beijing on the one hand, for the recent unpredictability shown by Washington from Donald Trump onwards on the other. Small agreements in times of big multilateral pacts thus mark a third way to try to maintain regional stability without being mere pawns in the game of others. But the agreements are beginning to be many. And when viewed as very thin threads of a broader, more expansive strategic canvas, the formula of the bilateral agreement as an inoffensive means of maneuver could be called into question. 

The semiconductor game gets political and becomes a team sport. At least on one side of the field. The four-party alliance wanted by the US aims to contain China. On which side will the ASEAN countries play?

Semiconductors are essential to the life and growth of digital society. A secure supply of these products is now a priority - and a headache - for governments around the world. There is still a global crisis in this industry's supply chains - a crisis that is part of a broader context of 'globalisation in turmoil' - which makes it difficult for other sectors to procure the necessary components. The problem is made even more complex by its political fallout. Indeed, the United States and China compete in the data economy and the development of new applications of artificial intelligence. This leads the two giants to demand a huge amount of chips and try to limit their rival's grip on the market. In the last months, Washington has taken the first steps towards the formation of a four-way semiconductor alliance with its historical partners on the China Sea - Japan, South Korea and Taiwan - in order to be able to develop 'democratic' supply chains, from the factory to consumers, without necessarily involving China. Beijing looks at the US initiative with concern, fearing being 'excluded' from the most important value chains in the globalised world.

The fragility and strategic importance of semiconductor supply chains have prompted governments to take action to secure their technological sovereignty. Many countries have taken steps to strengthen chip production in their own territory, in collaboration with the giants of the sector: just to mention two initiatives, Taiwanese TSMC is building a 12 billion production plant in Arizona with the support of the state and federal governments; Intel and the Italian government are closing negotiations for the creation of a production site in the Veneto region. Nevertheless, the semiconductor value chain cannot be enclosed within the borders of a single country, nor can it be so easily reorganised. Each stage of the production chain requires strong specialisation of entire industrial districts and high-tech equipment. At the moment, it does not seem possible to make chips without the involvement of East Asian countries. Therefore, governments are also trying to strengthen their international partnerships to secure supplies and overcome certain bottlenecks in production. Each of the Chip4 economies is particularly strong in one of the links of the chain and the alliance would be able to organise supplies between partners without relying heavily on external players. There are not only economic considerations behind Washington's initiative, however. The four countries are like-minded democracies that watch with some attention the growing Chinese influence not only in the region but also in the digital economy and some of its cutting-edge sectors. In a scenario of growing tensions with Beijing, the Chip4 countries might have an interest in not being dependent on the Chinese semiconductor industry.

Yet, it is not so easy to marginalise China from the value chain, especially for South Korea. Indeed, 60% of Seoul's chip exports go to its neighbour. Participating in an alliance that could be perceived as anti-Chinese would expose Korean manufacturers to trade retaliation, hence exclusion from a sizeable market. At the same time, Beijing might not be able to give up semiconductors made in Korea, as certain advanced technologies are only developed there or in the United States - and Washington has imposed sanctions and export control measures against Chinese companies as late as 2020. In other words, trying to exclude a country from the supply chain and, more generally, weaponising the sector for political objectives will always entail heavy costs and could make the semiconductor crisis even worse. Technological sovereignty could turn out to be an unachievable and, indeed, costly goal - there are not only duties imposed by governments, but also subsidies to attract private companies to their territory - as the disruption of the supply of even a minor component may paralyse the entire sector worldwide. The US initiative could also involve some ASEAN countries at some point. The semiconductor industry is developing fast in the region and some countries already play a key role - especially Malaysia and Singapore. In some cases, these are partners that Washington also recognises politically. Sooner or later, the US may try to involve them in initiatives like Chip4. All major ASEAN economies have an ambivalent relationship with China: on the one hand, a key economic partner; on the other, an increasingly assertive neighbour. Therefore, the same dilemma faced by Seoul today could arise for their governments. In any case, it must be remembered that the global semiconductor industry cannot prosper without a liberalised trading system shielded, as much as possible, from political tensions, due to the dense network of interdependencies between countries. The escalation of tensions between Washington and Beijing in this field would, in any case, have profoundly negative effects on the sector and would make its crisis even more complicated.

The EU is looking with increasing attention to the Asia-Pacific. Recently also with an unprecedented focus on securitarian aspects, in addition to and not in place of the approach traditionally hinging on soft power and economic cooperation 

The Indo-Pacific represents "the world's economic and strategic center of gravity." This is how Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, defined the region in March 2021, underscoring the urgency for the European Union to equip itself with a strategic approach to that area of the world that is catalyzing the attention and efforts of key international players.

The macro-region stretching from the east coast of Africa to the island states of the Pacific and East Asia contributes two-thirds of the global growth rate and a 62 percent share of the world's GDP and is home to four of the EU's ten largest partners (China, Japan, South Korea, and India), as well as more than half of the world's population. At the same time, it represents the main theater of geopolitical competition between China and the United States. Aware of its strategic significance, a number of European countries, such as Germany, France and the Netherlands, have long since put in place autonomous initiatives and strategies to protect national interests in the region, in an attempt to mitigate the consequences of Sino-US rivalry and from frictions between regional powers, which reverberate on global supply chains, trade and free navigation on the seas.

But the pandemic crisis and escalating political tensions and territorial disputes in the region have made the need for more concerted efforts obvious. On April 19, 2021, the European Council announced the approval of conclusions on a strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which aims to harmonize the different national orientations of member states into a common vision that can guide future long-term European engagement in the area. The 27 foreign ministers agreed on the goal of strengthening European engagement to "contribute to the stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development of the region," in line with common values of support for democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respect for international law.

As is typically the case, European engagement goes through the deepening of economic relations with countries in the area and the strengthening of the strategic trade position vis-à-vis the massive existing trading blocs in the area, a reflection of the agreements signed in recent years, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP). Goals include reaching free trade agreements with Australia, Indonesia and New Zealand and relaunching negotiations with India, building on the ambitious trade and investment agreements already signed with Vietnam, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore.

The strategy for the Indo-Pacific also introduces a novel focus on security aspects, distancing itself from an approach traditionally centered on soft power and economic and human rights cooperation. The strengthened European engagement takes the form of a series of initiatives ranging from traditional defense and security, such as joint military exercises with regional partners, to the more innovative domains of cyber security, and comes in response to China's growing assertiveness in the region.

As part of the European Critical Maritime Route Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO II) project, the EU has decided to expand the geographic scope of its critical maritime route protection operations. The scope of the project, inaugurated in 2015 with a focus on a few particular East African countries and archipelagos and currently in its second phase, now extends to include all countries bordering the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, and European authorities are exploring the possibility of replicating the experience in the South Pacific. In addition, the areas of cooperation have been expanded: alongside information sharing and training and capacity-building initiatives, some additional components of communication between law enforcement and the judiciary at the national, international, and regional levels and compliance with international regulations have been envisaged, to be implemented exclusively in the South and Southeast Asian areas.

Coordinated actions of this kind come alongside the autonomous deployment of naval forces by member states (and one former member state, namely the United Kingdom), some of which temporally precede any integrated strategy at the European level and are due to the historical presence of some countries in the region. First and foremost, France, the only European country with a permanent military presence in the area, in the face of impressive strategic interests, starting with the presence of some overseas territories, including the island of Reunion in the Indian Ocean and the archipelagos of French Polynesia in the South Pacific. Also significant is the contribution of the Royal Navy, which from 2021 inaugurated a significant strengthening of its naval presence in the area with the deployment of the mammoth aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth (R08) and its Carrier Strike Group (CSG). The Netherlands and Germany also helped fortify the European military commitment in the area by sending HNLMS Evertsen and Bayern frigates, respectively.

The Asia Pacific plan aligns with the Global Gateway, Europe's model of global partnerships for sustainable "reliable connectivity." This broader strategy takes the form of "smart, clean and secure" infrastructure investments in partner countries, with a focus on the key sectors of digital, energy and transport, health and research education, for which the Union and member states plan to mobilize up to €300 billion.

Although not made explicit in the document, some observers say the project may reflect a European desire to untangle itself from Sino-US competition by offering partner countries an alternative (albeit not perfectly overlapping in terms of modalities and funds invested) to similar connectivity initiatives: the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and the US-led Build Back Better World (B3W). However, the Union's approach to the region remains "geared toward cooperation, not seeking confrontation," as clarified by EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy spokeswoman Nabila Massrali and repeatedly stressed by European authorities. In the new strategy for the Indo-Pacific, the willingness to maintain an open and inclusive attitude toward all regional actors who share concerns, interests and values with the Union is openly emphasized. The chairwoman of the European Commission herself, Ursula von der Leyen, commented on Twitter, "We want a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific. It must be free, open, interconnected, prosperous, with a rules-based security architecture that serves all interests. We will continue to encourage Beijing to play its part in a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region."

It remains to be seen whether Europe will really be able to wade in between the two competing superpowers to pursue its own ambitious agenda, offering a real alternative to its regional partners, or whether its recent desire to increase its political, military and economic projection will only exacerbate the tense climate in the area. 

After the Australian elections last May, both Canberra and Wellington are led by Labour governments. Both countries maintain deep ties with the United States, but they have different approaches to growing Chinese assertiveness. Cooperation with ASEAN could play an important part in the stability of the region.

In the Australian elections last May, Australian Labor Party Leader Anthony Albanese defeated the incumbent Liberal Prime Minister Scott Morrison. After the administration change in Canberra, both Australia and New Zealand are led by Labour cabinets. Both governments play a complex game on the Indo-Pacific chessboard. On the one hand, the two countries represent the southern end of the 'Anglosphere' (and the related Five Eyes intelligence alliance) and are key partners of the United States - in short, a piece of the 'West' in the Far East. On the other hand, their relations with their Asian neighbours are marked by alternating phases of concern and trust, cooperation and tension. So what will be the Indo-Pacific strategy of Australia and New Zealand in the coming years?

Already during the election campaign, the Australian Labor Party had vigorously expressed its support for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad, which comprises Australia, India, Japan and the United States) and the AUKUS (which links Canberra to the US and the UK). Previous liberal-national governments had committed themselves to these agreements in 2017 and 2021, respectively. Barely three days after his election victory, the new PM Albanese was already in Tokyo for the Quad leaders' summit, at which he confirmed that his government would continue to support the Dialogue. At the same time, the Albanese administration intends to change certain aspects of the foreign policy of previous centre-right governments, ushering in a new phase of engagement with Pacific nations and commitment to international climate cooperation. The Morrisons governments had always opposed climate change policies - even when much of the country was engulfed in flames between 2019 and 2020 and rising sea levels are an existential threat to many countries in the region. So it is not surprising that Australia has been suffering from a poor standing among insular countries of the Pacific, which are most vulnerable to global warming. New Foreign Minister Penny Wong has also promised to increase financial support for Southeast Asian countries, so as to contain the growing Chinese influence in the region - Wong has recently defined the security pact between China and the Solomon Islands as the 'worst failure of Australian foreign policy in the Pacific since the end of World War II'.

Indeed, the expanding military influence of large Asian countries has always been seen as a threat by Canberra: first Japan, later China and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia. The improvement in relations between Beijing and Washington in the 1970s had also reassured Australians who had begun to see Asia as an opportunity rather than a threat. In the 1990s, another Labor PM, Paul Keating, had effectively summed up the paradigm shift shortly before concluding a security agreement with Jakarta: Australia was to pursue its security 'in Asia, not from Asia'. Relations between Australia and China have remained excellent for decades and still were so when Xi Jinping visited the country in 2014 for an official visit culminating in a historic address to the Australian Parliament. Nevertheless, the deterioration of China-US relations in recent years has been accompanied by a foreign policy shift with regard to Beijing, even in Canberra. Decades pass, but Australians continue to follow their American allies.

New Zealand, on the other hand, seems to have taken a more nuanced stance recently with regard to the US strategy for the Indo-Pacific. In early July, Labour PM Jacinda Ardern called for a more cautious approach to the Chinese presence in the region. For Ardern, it is wrong to regard Beijing's recent actions as 'new' and to require governments to take sides: ‘the honest reality is that the world is bloody messy. And yet, amongst all the complexity, we still often see issues portrayed in a black and white way’. Ardern's caution contrasts with Joe Biden's tough stance, according to which there is an ongoing battle between democracies and autocracies in the world which requires every government to pick a side. Wellington hopes for a de-escalation in the region and greater cooperation between all actors, even if Beijing becomes even more assertive. New Zealanders, however, are not indifferent to Chinese manoeuvres: they too, like Australia and the US, have expressed concern over the China-Solomon Islands defence agreement. Australia and New Zealand are in a position not different to the ASEAN countries, which are reluctant to get involved in the strategic competition between the US and China. Wellington seems intent on following a strategy similar to the one employed by other governments in the region: fostering dialogue with Beijing without renouncing strategic cooperation with Washington. Canberra, on the other hand, seems more rigid in its security concerns and more in line with Biden's vision. Both governments, however, could benefit from greater cooperation, especially with the ASEAN countries: the regional organisation in fact constitutes a factor of stability in the region and a central partner, as recognised in the Quad as well, which could balance Chinese assertiveness. The new Australian Labor government should, however, agree to cooperate with ASEAN on other issues and not exclusively on security: a strengthening of economic and political ties is preparatory and necessary if Albanese wants to move to other more sensitive forms of cooperation. International climate cooperation could be the first test and, as we have seen, the two Labour governments in Canberra and Wellington have expressed their intention to build new partnerships with other Indo-Pacific governments on the issue.

Looking at its initial stage and various forward looking engagements, it will be crucial to see how member nations adapt to the key objectives of this partnership

By Aishwarya Nautiyal

Indo Pacific strategy has not only shown a new synergy among QUAD partners but has given a footprint towards the new Indo Pacific Economic Framework recently launched by US President Joe Biden allowing 12 nations as the participating member also opening doors for any new nations willing to join in future. Among major economic powers like the US, Australia, India, South Korea and Japan, interestingly ASEAN member countries like Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam have been in the forefront of this newly documented framework. It is crucial to understand that the collective economy of member nations represents nearly 40% of the world’s GDP. This opens the door for an opportunity for countries in the Pacific and Indian Ocean region who are also involved in various economic and security partnerships towards a collective effort to “grow faster and fairer”. Although it is interesting to see that it isn’t an official trade pact, trade has become a “pillar” in this whole framework along with other key elements.

      Though at the initial stage many later negotiations and amendments can be discussed among member nations, the key scenarios have been focused upon certain themes such as Supply Chain, Infrastructure, Green energy, decarbonization, tax and anti corruption and flow of free and fair trade. Thus this can be seen as a counterbalance to RCEP which is a free trade agreement as it outweighs both population and GDP. ASEAN countries that have not been included are Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. Whereas China has raised its criticism for further economic decoupling perhaps it has also been excluded in this partnership. Interestingly countries such as the United States and India who have not participated in RCEP have been in the forefront in this new framework. India’s vision towards “Look East Policy” has brought ASEAN members to its core of foreign policy thus this new initiative brings the cooperation between India and ASEAN with a vision for strengthening a multilateral framework with other major economies to Pacific Ocean region. 

        Looking at future geoeconomics and geopolitics, the key pillar lies towards a resilient and fair economy which was also a highlight of President Biden’s statement during the East Asia Summit. This can also be seen as a possible replacement of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Interestingly launch of IPEF just a day before QUAD summit in Tokyo, Japan has brought two platforms where economic base along with QUAD partners has initiated a new American led engagement to redesign partnership in various level among regional and global partners extending from East China Sea to South China Sea and further to Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. Bay of Bengal is a very crucial juncture between India and ASEAN nations. The crucial Strait of Malacca is a key for various goods and energy trade. Apart from India-ASEAN partnership IPEF gives a chance to expand beyond regional to global cooperation.

     Economic integration by creating new technological innovations also creating an industrial supply chain in which India is actively looking to become a new focal point with the future participation of various ASEAN nations in several industrial and technological investments such as semiconductors. Whereas India has been keenly working on enhancing economic connectivity by boosting investments in various infrastructure projects connecting ASEAN nations with the North East part of India. On the other hand US’s willingness to extend cooperation to strengthen the digital based economy and trade inclusive of purchase, sales, data flow enabling global value chain and smart services through several platforms and applications. The key idea is to ensure downstream costs for businesses and enhance the ability for processing of data and analysis, securing a secure platform for business continuity whereas access to key raw materials such as semiconductors, minerals and energy technology boosting the key pillars of IPEF is supply chain resilience.

       On the other hand, decarbonization and building new infrastructure to overcome key issues of global warming and rising levels of pollution by providing finances and technology to share technical assistance and mobilize concessional finances by adopting durable infrastructure for renewable energy. Tax and anti corruption is aimed to promote free and fair competition overcoming issues of taxation, money laundering and bribery through multilateral standards and agreements adopted by the members of IPEF. Looking at its initial stage and various forward looking engagements, it will be crucial to see how member nations adapt to the key objectives of this partnership and the level of confidence building with various engagements in near future ensuring regional and global geographic and economic obligations by creating new opportunities and avenues for future nations willing to be a part of comprehensive economic cooperation of IPEF.

The cooperation is not only limited to military engagement but has moved forward with future looking prospects in space and intelligence

By Aishwarya Nautiyal

ASEAN Regional forum which is a major platform of ASEAN security dialogue for consultation and cooperation at a highest level of defense engagement has seen an active participation of India prioritizing relations between ASEAN-India highlighting the importance of the forum as a key towards regional engagement with a vision of mutual security and growth maintaining the equilibrium through port visits and military exercises. India’s Act East Policy has brought new platforms like SIMBEX and SITMEX with Singapore and Thailand through military drills ensuring readiness to maintain regional peace and security. Maritime engagement by taking advantage of the strategic geographic location of Andaman & Nicobar (India) islands and its neighbors such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore that provides a key focus to Malacca cooperation and promoting a secured line for international trading channels.

      India has also been looking forward to providing various defense platforms such as Brahmos missile systems to the Philippines which nearly cost around 375$ million for the navy. On the other hand India and Singapore have shown a significant growth in bilateral security cooperation engaging in various naval exercises including new naval cooperation where India gained access to Changi naval base for its ships with refueling rights and logistics support. The agreement also provides a provision for mutual restock and rearm on each other's military bases. One of the significant developments can be seen with India-Vietnam defense cooperation where India gained access to Cham Ranh Bay naval and air base also providing training and advanced weapon systems to Vietnamese defense forces. Till now 550 Vietnamese submariners have gained in-depth training and knowledge at INS Satavahana submarine training base along with 100$ million credit to buy Indian defense equipment. Vietnamese pilots regularly get trained for Sukhoi platforms whereas private enterprise engagement can also be seen with Larsen and Toubro to equip Vietnamese Border Guards with 12 offshore vessels.In 2016, a new credit line of 500$ million has been provided for procurement of new defense platforms.

     The cooperation is not only limited to military engagement but has moved forward with future looking prospects in space and intelligence. India’s decision to establish a satellite tracking and imaging system around Ho Chi Minh city with the funding from ISRO of 23$ million for tracking and exchanging data with Vietnam and sharing future surveillance and intelligence linked up with stations in Biak in Indonesia and Brunei. Looking at a new geo strategic convergence several warships from Eastern naval command of India have been dispatched with an aim to engage bilateral exercises with Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. Recently, Malaysia tends to procure Lightweight fighters and has engaged Indian fighter jet TEJAS to participate in procurement tender along with other global competitors. This is the first time that an Indian origin jet has been involved in a global tender. Mekong- Ganga Cooperation in which India and Vietnam are both members along with other other ASEAN members such as Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos. The key focus of this engagement lies towards cooperation in exchange of culture and tourism along with educational and transportation development.

      India Thailand shares their maritime boundary through a crucial trading route of Malacca Strait. This brings both the countries at a focal point of ensuring safety and security of the Bay of Bengal region. The relations between two countries have been centuries old with several historic commonalities within their cultural relations. India has been providing regular engineers and medical delegations in various exercises conducted between two nations including Ex- Cobra Gold one of the largest military exercises. The 31st edition of India-Thailand Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) was one of such engagements where HTMS Krabi along with INS Saryu and Dornier Patrol Aircraft have been engaged for 3 days near strategically located Andaman Sea. Bridging the friendship between two militaries along with several issues such as unregulated fishing, drug trafficking, piracy, terrorism, smuggling and illegal immigration including relief operations at sea have been a key fundamental in understanding interoperability between two navies in CORPAT.

      With India looking forward to expansion of its geostrategic footprint in Southeast Asia, energy rich Brunei seems to feature in a prominent position in India’s Act East policy. Till now the relations haven’t been in focus and have not been able to realize it’s full potential but with new vision India is looking forward to increase the level of intensity and vitality of connecting with Brunei as a crucial maritime partner. The port led development where Maura port can be a new focal point of Indian policymakers along with India- Brunei agreement in 2018 to boost defense relations including exchange of information, exercises, training and defense industrial development. Being at a crucial juncture of changing global dynamics from Europe to the Middle East, South Asia is becoming more and more crucial in balancing and benefitting through various platforms in which defense and intelligence cooperation has its own pivotal role ensuring trust between regional partners.