Global Lens

Southeast Asian countries are the most active and willing to avoid nuclear weapons proliferation in the region

By Francesca Leva

At a United Nations speech delivered last March, the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres declared that the risk of a nuclear war is at “its highest point in decades” and that nuclear weapons are “growing in power, range, and stealth,” adding that “an accidental launch is one mistake, one miscalculation, one rash act away.”

Asia makes no exception: there, nuclear weapons had a profound influence on both public health and the environment, resulting in the displacement of people and hindering development, education, cultural preservation, and economic stability.

Nuclear weapons first arrived in Asia in 1945 with the tragic events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A few years later, the URSS also announced its nuclear weapons programs: during the Cold War, from 1950 to the 1990s, the MAD – “Mutual Assured Destruction” – phrase was used to describe the nuclear build-up phase between the US and the URSS. As a result, in 1957, the UN established the IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency - recognizing the need for peaceful development of nuclear power. In 1968 the UN also adopted the NPT – Non-proliferation Treaty -, whereby only the five nuclear States of the time, the US, China, Russia, the UK, and France, were allowed to possess nuclear weapons, but would also agree to the peaceful application of nuclear technology and the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. However, several non-signatory countries of the NPT started to develop nuclear weapons on their own: among them India, Pakistan, and Israel. As a matter of fact, in 1988, India detonated three bombs close to the border with Pakistan, an action that was immediately followed by Islamabad’s nuclear tests.

What seems to be the pattern is that when a country develops a nuclear weapon, its threatened neighbors and enemies will also start nuclear testing, both for self-preservation and national pride. This dilemma poses a concrete threat to Asia, where China, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and the Russian Federation are all nuclear countries.

One of the main flashpoints in Asia is the so-called “nuclear triangle,” constituted by China, India, and Pakistan. In this case, the risk is ignited by regional competition, domestic situations and tech developments. The development of Pakistan’s full-spectrum deterrence has, in fact, led to India’s development of a preemptive counterforce nuclear system. This nuclear threat is further enhanced by US-China competition. While Beijing tries to match Washington’s nuclear capabilities, India is also incentivized to maximize its nuclear arsenal, shifting away from its traditional “no-first-use policy.” Pakistan's devolving domestic situation, as well as the increasing Pakistan–India competition, add to the risk of accidental use, inadvertent escalation, and nuclear brinkmanship. 

A further potential flashpoint is constituted by North Korea and South Korea; the risk is not only the one of a war between Seoul and Pyongyang but also the fact that both South Korea and Japan might feel pressed to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Finally, other possible tension areas are in the South-China Sea, where regional competition as well as national priorities collide.

In 1995, the ASEAN member States signed the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone - SEANWFZ, also known as the Bangkok Treaty – which was originally devised to reaffirm the importance of the NPT and to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ). There are currently five NWFZs in the world, and they all represent a regional approach to strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. In the designated areas covered by the NWFZ treaties, it is explicitly prohibited to engage in activities related to the acquisition, possession, placement, testing, and utilization of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the States that have ratified these treaties are actively working towards establishing legally binding agreements to ensure that nuclear-armed nations refrain from deploying nuclear weapons against any of the countries within these zones.

However, there has been growing preoccupation and skepticism among the NPT signatory countries, as the five NPT states have continued to develop their own nuclear arsenals; the NPT was unable to integrate non-signatory countries – especially India, Pakistan, and Israel – and it was also ineffective in bringing back North Korea. As a consequence, in 2017, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was crafted to reinforce the NPT and signed by all ASEAN countries besides Singapore. Although the outcome of these measures remains uncertain, it is evident that the nuclear threat represents an unacceptable risk for Asian countries, especially considering the number, the density, and the proximity of urban and inhabited areas.

The inauguration of new President Lai Ching-te in Taipei and the possible economic and political repercussions in Southeast Asia

By Luca Menghini

On May 20, Lai Ching-te will officially become the new President of Taiwan. This event is significant not only for the island but also for the geopolitical context of the entire Southeast Asia. Taiwan is indeed preparing for a significant change with the inauguration of a leader from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), known for its leanings towards the island's independence from China. Lai secured 40.1% of the votes, surpassing candidates from the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP). Despite the DPP's victory, the party lost control of the legislative assembly, forcing the new president to seek broader consensus which will lead him to moderate his more extreme policies.

The loss of the parliamentary majority could be seen by ASEAN as an element of stability, as it might mitigate Lai's policies, thus reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. This area is of vital strategic importance, being a crucial maritime corridor for global trade. ASEAN, which traditionally follows a policy of non-interference and consensus, reacted cautiously to Lai's election. The member countries, located in a region crossed by various trade routes and spheres of influence of major powers, strive to maintain a balance to avoid conflicts. The stability of the strait is essential not only for regional security but also for the global economy.

During the period leading up to the elections, tensions between Taiwan and China grew, especially during the presidency of Tsai Ing-wen, who sought to strengthen ties with the United States. China responded by increasing military and diplomatic pressure on the island, which it considers a rebel province to be reunified in the future. While the reaction of ASEAN and most of its member countries to Lai's election was generally subdued, with most countries avoiding taking strong public positions, the same cannot be said for Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Marcos was the only leader to break from this line, publicly congratulating Lai and referring to him as president, highlighting the hope for close collaboration and strengthening of mutual interests. This move was not viewed favorably by China, which, claiming Taiwan as part of its territory, does not recognize Lai's title as president. Even more critical was China's reaction to the congratulations extended by the United States through Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accusing the U.S. government of sending "a seriously wrong signal to the separatist forces for Taiwan's independence."

On the economic front, the New Southbound Policy, initiated by former President Tsai Ing-wen starting in 2016, aimed to reduce Taiwan's economic dependence on China, promoting economic cooperation with 18 countries, including ASEAN members, six South Asian states, Australia, and New Zealand. This initiative sought to enhance economic and commercial cooperation, as well as the exchange of talents and resources. However, despite the efforts, reactions have been mixed, also influenced by the caution of various governments trying to avoid irritating China. Taiwan's Minister of Economic Affairs, Wang Mei-hua, indicated that in 2022, investments by Taiwanese companies in Southeast and South Asia surpassed investments in China, reaching $5.2 billion. This increase was driven by trade tensions between the United States and China, but the geopolitical proximity to China continues to represent a significant obstacle for a freer expansion of Taiwan's trade relations.

Now, with the inauguration of Lai, it is expected that Taiwan's commitment to Southeast Asia will continue to increase and even intensify further, with particular attention to cooperation in the high-tech industry. However, the growing influence of China in the region represents an imminent challenge. A recent survey showed that most Southeast Asian countries favor China over the United States. The complex situation will indeed require Lai to carefully balance the promotion of Taiwan's economic interests with the need to navigate the political and diplomatic sensitivities of Southeast Asia.

In conclusion, the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as president of Taiwan represents a significant moment for the island's politics. Faced with the loss of the parliamentary majority and growing tensions with China, Lai will have to navigate an increasingly complex geopolitical context, trying to balance his party's independentist aspirations with the need to maintain stability and peaceful relations in the region. His policies, particularly the strengthening of relations with Southeast Asian countries and beyond, will be crucial for Taiwan's security and economic progress. In this delicate balance, Lai's ability to conduct effective diplomacy and promote sustainable economic growth, while managing external pressures, will define the success of his tenure and potentially influence the regional order of Southeast Asia for the coming years.

We publish here an excerpt of a commentary by Alex Lo, published in the South China Morning Post

China has dethroned the United States as the superpower's preferred partner in Southeast Asia. The findings emerge from the latest annual survey of 1,994 politicians, journalists, businessmen and analysts from ASEAN countries by the Singapore-based think tank, the ASEAN Studies Centre of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. When asked which superpower they would take sides if forced to do so, 50.5 percent chose China versus 49.5 percent who chose the United States. That is a very narrow margin and is within the margin of error. So, let's say it's a tie. This should worry Washington, however, because last year the results were 61.1 percent for the United States and 38.9 percent for China. It is worth noting that this is a survey of elites, not ordinary citizens. So even if it does not directly reflect popular sentiments, it can say a lot about the real political directions of the countries concerned. There is another obvious conclusion: Southeast Asia does not want to choose sides, nor do Latin America and Africa. Thus, while it is normal for U.S. allies to follow Washington's lead, the rest of the world, particularly the Global South, do not believe it is in their own interest to join the superpower rivalry. On the contrary, they believe it can cause a lot of damage. Not surprisingly, ASEAN considers unemployment and recession to be the region's most pressing concern (57.7 percent). Like it or not, its economic fortunes are tied to China's. That is why China is considered "the most influential economic (59.5 percent) and political-strategic (43.9 percent) power in the region, surpassing the United States by significant margins in both areas." China, with an average score of 8.98 out of 11.0, tops the list in terms of strategic relevance to ASEAN, followed by the United States (8.79) and Japan (7.48). Partners of lower strategic importance are: India (5.04), Canada (3.81) and New Zealand (3.70). The survey appears quite indicative of the situation in ASEAN. The region the Association represents wants the security provided by the United States, but is wary of their economic initiatives. With China it is the opposite. It does not want China to threaten its security, nor does it want the United States to undermine its hard-won prosperity, in a new Cold War. No one wants to be trapped between two gorillas.

Southeast Asia's view on the new regulation that blocks imports of palm oil resulting from deforestation

“Can Europe save forests without killing jobs in Malaysia?” This was asked in a recent New York Times article, evidence that this is a particularly relevant topic not only at a bilateral but also international level. The European Union's looming ban on imports linked to deforestation has been hailed as a new standard to be met in climate policy - a significant step to protect the world's forests, which helps remove planet-killing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere . “The law requires traders to trace the origins of a mind-boggling variety of products: beef and books, chocolate and coal, lipstick and leather. For the European Union, the mandate, which will come into force next year, is a testament to the bloc's role as a global leader on climate change,” writes the New York Times, which however adds: “The move, however, remained caught in conflicting currents about how to address the economic and political trade-offs required by climate change.” In fact, developing countries are certainly not content, with Malaysia and Indonesia among the most explicit in criticizing the new legislation. Together, the two Southeast Asian countries supply 85% of the world's palm oil, one of seven critical products covered by the European Union ban. And I argue that the law puts their economies at risk. In their eyes, writes the New York Times, rich and technologically advanced countries (and former colonial powers) "are once again dictating terms and changing the rules of trade when it suits them". This view accords with developing countries' complaints that the dominant international order neglects their concerns. The dispute over palm oil also contains a central point in the economics of climate change, underlines the US newspaper: the thesis according to which middle- and low-income nations are forced to bear the cost of disastrous environmental changes caused mainly by the most rich. In its 2022 annual survey, the World Resources Institute found that Malaysia was one of the few places where deforestation did not worsen. And perhaps there is a space to protect both climate and economic needs, preserving the fruitful relations between the countries of South-East Asia and the European Union.

In recent years, Beijing and Southeast Asian countries have signed a series of economic cooperation agreements

Editorial by Lorenzo Riccardi, Managing Partner RsA Asia

Beijing's role in Asia is promoted through the volume of trade and the number of bilateral and multilateral agreements. In the Asia-Pacific region, China has signed 42 double taxation agreements, ten free trade agreements, and has promoted multilateral free trade agreements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) nations, Gulf economies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates), and Northeast Asian countries (Japan and Korea). The number of tax treaties, investment agreements, and free trade agreements is proportionally much higher in the neighboring countries of the Eastern area compared to other regions of the planet. This determines an accelerated trend in economic relations, especially with the primary trading partner: the ASEAN bloc. To strengthen the trade partnership, China and ASEAN have signed a series of agreements on economic cooperation over the past 20 years. These include a comprehensive agreement on global economic cooperation between ASEAN and China in 2002, the establishment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) implemented in several phases between 2005 and 2010, the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement in force since 2008, an ASEAN-China investment agreement in 2009, the ASEAN-Hong Kong SAR China Free Trade Agreement in force since 2019, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership signed in 2020, and the free trade agreement with Cambodia in force since 2022. Beijing has also signed mutual visa exemption agreements between 2023 and 2024 with Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. A visa-on-arrival procedure is expected for Chinese citizens traveling to Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, and Myanmar, and a simplified e-visa procedure for Vietnam. Among the ASEAN countries, only the Philippines require advance visas for Chinese visitors. In China-ASEAN trade, Kuala Lumpur is the largest exporter with USD 102 billion in data from Chinese customs in 2023 (almost four times the volume of Italian exports to China), while Hanoi is the largest importer of Chinese products with about USD 137 billion. ASEAN and Beijing grow beyond the global average, and China has its primary trading partner in Southeast Asia with USD 911 billion in trade in December 2023, surpassing the aggregated import and export volume recorded by the People's Republic with the European Union (USD 783 billion) and the United States (USD 664 billion).

Pubblichiamo qui uno stralcio del discorso della Ministra degli Esteri Penny Wong al summit di Melbourne tra Australia e ASEAN

Quando l’ASEAN era ancora agli albori, circa cinquant’anni fa, il nostro visionario Primo Ministro Gough Whitlam riconobbe che l’ASEAN era già centrale nella gestione delle sfide della regione, e capì che lo sarebbe diventata sempre di più. Per questo motivo, si impegnò con entusiasmo a favore dell’ASEAN e ben presto l’Australia divenne il primo paese non membro a stabilire relazioni formali, quando il Primo Ministro Whitlam firmò per l’Australia come primo partner di dialogo dell’ASEAN. Il Primo Ministro Whitlam sapeva che, sebbene gran parte della nostra storia fosse in Europa, la nostra casa e il nostro futuro sono nella nostra regione. Ha riconosciuto il ruolo che il Sud-Est asiatico avrebbe avuto nel destino dell’Australia e del mondo. A sua volta, Whitlam vedeva l’Australia come “un vero partecipante al destino della regione”. E, come sempre, pensando al futuro, disse: “Non si può tornare indietro da questo impegno”. In effetti, è stato dimostrato che aveva ragione. E il nostro impegno è cresciuto fino a diventare un Partenariato strategico globale tra l’ASEAN e l’Australia, la formalizzazione dell’impegno permanente dell’Australia nei confronti della centralità dell’ASEAN. La formalizzazione di una verità che l’Australia non solo riconosce, ma abbraccia: condividiamo una regione e un futuro. Siamo legati dalla geografia che il destino ha scelto per noi e siamo rafforzati dal partenariato che abbiamo scelto per noi stessi. Le nostre nazioni e i nostri popoli si arricchiscono con gli scambi commerciali. Le nostre nazioni e i nostri popoli beneficiano della pace, della stabilità e della sicurezza che costruiamo insieme. La nostra fede nel successo condiviso è alla base dell’impegno dell’Australia per un maggiore partenariato economico. Abbiamo tutti la responsabilità di plasmare la regione che vogliamo condividere: pacifica, stabile e prospera. I nostri partenariati di difesa di lunga data nella regione, anche con gli Stati membri dell’ASEAN, non costruiscono solo interoperabilità, ma anche amicizia e comprensione. I Paesi della nostra regione dipendono dagli oceani, dai mari e dai fiumi per il loro sostentamento e per il commercio, comprese le rotte marittime libere e aperte nel Mar Cinese Meridionale. Per questo sono lieta di annunciare che nei prossimi quattro anni stanzieremo altri 64 milioni di dollari, di cui 40 milioni di dollari di nuovi finanziamenti, per potenziare i partenariati marittimi australiani nel Sud-Est asiatico. Sono inoltre lieta di annunciare un ulteriore stanziamento di 222,5 milioni di dollari per sostenere la resilienza nella subregione del Mekong. Una seconda fase del Partenariato Mekong-Australia porterà investimenti nella sicurezza idrica, nella resilienza ai cambiamenti climatici, nella lotta alla criminalità transnazionale e nel rafforzamento della leadership subregionale.

Association secretary general's trip to New Delhi brings bloc closer to Asian giant

At the invitation of the Government of the Republic of India, H.E. Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, Secretary-General of ASEAN, paid a working visit to India from Feb. 12-15, 2024. February. The purpose of the visit was to further advance the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSC) by reactivating engagements across the spectrum of ASEAN's three community pillars and promoting ASEAN diplomacy and visibility in India. Rooted in centuries of civil ties, maritime connectivity and cross-cultural exchanges, the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership continued to gain momentum. During the visit, India reaffirmed to the ASEAN Secretary-General its commitment to work with ASEAN and its partners in support of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. India expressed its unwavering support for the centrality of ASEAN and the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Perspectives (AOIP) as the principle and framework for promoting cooperation in the region. The visit highlighted India's position as ASEAN's eighth largest trading partner, with total trade of $113.08 billion, accounting for 2.94 percent of ASEAN's total trade. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment flows from India to ASEAN totaled $0.68 billion in 2022. To further maximize the potential of ASEAN-India economic cooperation while at the same time geo-economic uncertainties, the ASEAN Secretary-General has communicated to India the need for both sides to further increase trade and investment including through full and effective utilization of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA), early utilization of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA), early conclusion of the ASEAN-India Agreement on Trade in Goods (AITIGA) review negotiations, and India's potential participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Meanwhile, in the tourism sector, discussions during the visit noted a significant increase in the number of visitor arrivals from India to ASEAN to 2.38 million by 2022. This reflects the positive signs of the post-COVID-19 recovery, which is expected to further benefit both sides through the development of sustainable tourism and collaboration on marketing initiatives to present ASEAN as a unique tourism destination for the Indian market.

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We publish here an excerpt from the final document of the January 28-29 meeting in Luang Prabang, Laos, between ASEAN foreign ministers 

On January 29, 2024, the Lao Foreign Ministers' retreat was held in Luang Prabang, Lao PDR. We had in-depth discussions on the implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and priorities for the Lao chairmanship in 2024, as well as concrete and sustainable ways to further strengthen the ASEAN Community, ASEAN's unity, centrality and resilience amid regional and global challenges. We also exchanged views on ASEAN's external relations and recent regional and international developments of common interest and concern. 

We reaffirmed our strong commitment to upholding regionalism and multilateralism, and stressed the importance of adhering to the key principles, shared values and norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the ASEAN Charter, the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ).

We reaffirmed our shared commitment to maintaining and promoting peace, security and stability in the region, and to the peaceful resolution of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resort to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the principles of international law.

We discussed the developments in Myanmar and reaffirmed our unified position that the five-point consensus remains our main reference for addressing the political crisis in Myanmar, with the sole objective of restoring peace, stability and a Myanmar-led comprehensive political resolution. We welcomed the ASEAN leaders' reviews and decisions on the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus Five-Point Consensus, adopted at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits in 2022 and the 43rd ASEAN Summit in 2023. 

We reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to assist Myanmar in finding a peaceful, comprehensive and lasting solution to the ongoing conflict, as Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN. ASEAN member states welcomed the appointment of H.E. Alounkeo KITTIKHOUN, former Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, as the ASEAN Chair's Special Envoy for Myanmar for 2024, as we continue our efforts to promote progress in the implementation of the Partnership Agreement with Myanmar.

We appreciated his efforts to date to reach out to stakeholders and trust his willingness to help the people of Myanmar find a Myanmar-led solution toward a peaceful, stable, and unified Myanmar that contributes to peace and prosperity in the region.

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