Asean

According to Richard Heydarian of the University of the Philippines, cooperation among member countries is also useful at the bilateral or trilateral level

During a state visit to Vietnam a few weeks ago, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed an agreement to expand bilateral cooperation on maritime security. The two governments signaled that they will work more closely together to protect common interests in the South China Sea, especially with their coast guard forces. The announcement followed a similar face-to-face on security cooperation earlier in Manila between Marcos and Indonesian President Joko Widodo, who also made stops in Vietnam and Brunei. "These visits are more than symbolic," argues Richard Heydarian, senior lecturer at the University of the Philippines' Asia Center, in a commentary published in Nikkei Asia in recent days. According to Heydarian, considering the fact that ASEAN focuses on decision-making by consensus, "the bloc has sometimes been slow and unresponsive to major crises in its own backyard." In this context, Heydarian argues that "minilateral" cooperation among key members with common strategic interests "has the potential to make Southeast Asia a much more effective force in the Indo-Pacific region." Not a replacement for the bloc's role, but an extension and perhaps an enhancement of it. The expert commentary reads, "Although the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam are developing nations with relatively limited military capabilities, the trio can collectively contribute to ASEAN's centrality in shaping the regional security architecture and with greater strategic coordination." This year has already begun as a productive one for ASEAN minilateralism. Under strategic cooperation, Hanoi and Manila will collaborate on infrastructure development and co-production of batteries for electric vehicles, tapping the Philippines' large reserves of copper, nickel and cobalt. Vietnam in particular is the source of about 90 percent of the Philippines' rice imports. Later this year, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan are likely to join Vietnam for the annual Marpolex marine pollution exercise. Thus, minilateralism can also be useful in other areas besides security, according to Heydarian.

The two blocs held their 24th ministerial meeting in Brussels, agreeing to intensify relations

At the 24th ASEAN-EU ministerial meeting held in Brussels on Feb. 2, it was agreed to further intensify trade and investment relations between the countries. "We were encouraged by the strong economic cooperation between ASEAN and the EU, which is ASEAN's third largest foreign investor and third largest trading partner in 2022, and reaffirmed our commitment to use this positive momentum to further intensify trade and investment relations between ASEAN and the EU," reads the joint ministerial statement issued on Saturday, Feb. 3. At the meeting, attended by foreign ministers from ASEAN and EU member countries, the ASEAN Secretariat and the European Commission, as well as Timor-Leste as an ASEAN observer, ASEAN reiterated the importance of finding solutions to long-standing market access problems. Both sides also welcome opportunities to increase trade and investment through bilateral free trade agreements, strengthen connectivity and economic relations between the two regions, and enhance sustainable development for both sides, such as through the ASEAN-EU Joint Working Group on Trade and Investment (JWG). "We will intensify our engagement on trade and economic issues and explore other venues in the short and medium term to promote cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as the digital economy, green technologies and services, sustainable production and consumption of raw materials, and supply chain resilience, while reaffirming a future ASEAN-EU free trade agreement as a common long-term goal," the communiqué reads. In addition, during the meeting chaired by Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo and European Commission Vice President Josep Borrell, ASEAN and the EU reaffirmed the shared values and common interests that have underpinned the 47-year ASEAN-EU dialogue relationship and expressed satisfaction with the comprehensive and diverse nature of the dynamic partnerships. They also reaffirmed the strategic partnership and common interest in keeping the regions peaceful, stable and prosperous, upholding and respecting international law and the international order based on rules and adherence to international law, and maintaining peace, security and stability, including through such measures as the promotion and protection of human rights, including for people with disabilities, gender equality and fundamental freedoms.

Click here to read the communiqué in full

Tensions over disputed waters between China and the Philippines have escalated during 2023, as Vietnam tries to keep its balance while deepening relations with the United States. Beijing moves on Cambodia and Thailand, both of which have a new premier

By Sabrina Moles

"A maritime community of shared destiny." And here the Xi Jinping-era motto about "a community of shared destiny" becomes a message thrown toward its "sea" neighborhood. A neighborhood that is certainly not stable, and now more than ever an object of attention for all those economic, political and social realities that overlook a 3.6 million square kilometer body of water that affects 60 percent of global maritime trade. According to 2017 data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Csis), more than $3.37 trillion worth of goods transit these waters, and just as many opportunities still lurk in the depths: metals, oil, gas. 

If the Pacific in general is now one of the hottest spots in international dynamics the South China Sea sits there like an active volcano that could erupt at any moment. With the end of the pandemic, the monitoring and patrolling of the area that each government carries out to protect its sovereignty over part of these waters has also resumed, and any confrontation-particularly with Chinese vessels-could light the fuse. Diplomacy has taken few steps to protect freedom of navigation, and future years will decide the fate of these claims.

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rejected China's claims, following a complaint by the Philippine government in 2013. Since then, the process of redefining rights of passage and exploitation of natural deposits has also suffered continuous interruptions. Nations in the area have long demanded respect for the rules covered by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which does not cover the kind of "historic" sovereignty Beijing claims to have over the South China Sea. An area circumscribed by the so-called "nine-dash line" on its maps that encloses what the People's Republic considers to be its waters.

Since the 1990s, countries in the region have been trying to build a dialogue that could lead to the establishment of shared rules. The most significant progress came in 2002 with the ratification of a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (Doc), but since then the idea of a binding Code of Conduct (Coc) has never really taken off. On the sidelines of the July 2023 ministerial, China and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) established "common guidelines" to speed up negotiations, an action that reflects an attempt to revive the initiative but still sees the group's countries divided. 

Indonesia, as chair for 2023, hosted the Association's first joint maritime exercises near the nine-stretch line. Signs that put China on edge, but not too much. In Asean, outside the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the issue is less of a priority and may return to the margins in view of the rotating presidency of Laos, a country very close to Beijing. Indeed, the principle of consensus understood as unanimous agreement among the parties does not allow for the landing of a more determined strategy toward China. 

Chinese companies and armed forces, meanwhile, continue to build. China has already placed military bases in the Spratlys, to the point that-according to U.S. Navy reports-three of these islets can be described as fully militarized due to the presence of anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems. 

The presence of Chinese ships remains constant and "alarming," Manila said of the record 153 Chinese-flagged vessels located near its exclusive economic zone. Confrontations with Chinese vessels going as far as 800,000 nautical miles beyond its zone of jurisdiction are not uncommon, according to Coast Guard reports from countries in the area. The list includes the less than ten-meter ship approach between a Vietnamese fishing vessel fishing and the Chinese navy in March 2023, the two collisions between Chinese vessels and Philippine ships in October 2023, and the confrontation between Chinese ships and the Philippine Coast Guard with the opening of water cannons. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos has adopted a more aggressive policy on maritime security, returning to strengthening military cooperation with the United States. 

Negotiations for an agreement with Hanoi are also underway. It is precisely Vietnam's position that is most under attention. Last September Joe Biden was in Hanoi for a visit described as "historic" and which led to his being received at the Vietnamese Communist Party headquarters. Bilateral relations have been high and contacts on military supplies have deepened, with Vietnam fearing a growing alignment between China and Russia after the war in Ukraine, with the latter struggling to maintain its position as a defense supplier. But beware of thinking that Hanoi is ready to be enlisted by anyone. Compared to the more assertive Philippines, Vietnam continues to want to balance its position, as evidenced by Xi Jinping's December visit. An important signal of assurance for Beijing.

On the Thailand and Cambodia side, however, the approach to maritime security appears softer toward the Chinese giant. Having validated the rise of Hun Manet, son of former Prime Minister Hun Sen who officially became his heir after the July elections, a prospect of continued good neighborly relations is now before observers' eyes. The first signs came with the ban on U.S. officials' access to the Ream naval base in 2021, while the news of the first docking of Chinese ships at one of the key military facilities in the region is from December 2023.

Militarily, China has also been catching up with Thailand, with which it has long held joint exercises. While in 2017 the agreements called for one naval exercise, in 2023 the frequency of meetings increased to three, including air and ground operations. Washington has reduced the scope of military cooperation since the 2014 coup, creating a vacuum that China soon sought to fill. 

The function of the military in the political arena is not monolithic, and variations in this role are clearly evident in the context of Southeast Asia

By Aniello Iannone

For several Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia and Myanmar, the role of the military in domestic politics has been one of the most significant elements in the development of the region's political history. Indonesia's history is a telling example, with a military regime in power for several decades in the second half of the 20th century that eventually went through a process of transition to democracy in the late 1990s. Thailand also provides an example of a country where the military influenced constitutional changes to insert itself into the political decision-making process. This has created a unique political dynamic in the country, with the military playing a major role in national politics. On the other hand, there are countries such as Myanmar, where the military has also tended to use force and interference in national decision-making processes. 

Indonesia and the role of the military 

'Indonesia declared its independence at the end of Dutch colonial rule and Japanese occupation in 1945. Since then, the country has gone through a series of significant reform and transformation events, including developments in the armed forces. The Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), formerly known as ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), was established in 1945 with the primary task of protecting and defending the nation. This role was paramount during the struggle for independence against Dutch invasion after Japan left the country defeated during World War II. During this period, the role of the TNI was emphasized, and senior military leaders stressed the importance of the TNI in resisting the Dutch invasion. This situation laid the foundation for indoctrination and military-civilian involvement in Indonesian politics.

However, when the TNI failed to achieve a satisfactory role in line with its aspirations in Indonesian politics under Soekarno's leadership, a political and economic crisis that hit Indonesia in the 1950s during Soekarno's "guided democracy" was an opportunity for the military to take action to get involved in Indonesian politics. These events occurred at the same time as a series of tensions between the military, radical Muslim groups, the rebellion of the Communist Party Indonesia (PKI), tensions also due dalal economic crisis due to inadequate economic policies of Soekarno The situation peaked in the coup led by Soeharto on September 30, 1965, who later assumed the presidency in 1968.

The main consequences of the 1965 events, besides the genocide and elimination of the PKI, saw the establishment of an authoritarian regime from 1965 to 1998. The Soeharto era, often called the New Order, is an example of an authoritarian regime established through a military coup. It is important to consider the significant role played by the armed forces until the fall of this regime and during the initial period of "reformasi," which refers to the reform movement that followed Soeharto's resignation. The TNI, known as ABRI (1959-2000), played a key role as the backbone of the state, being until the fall of the regime the largest political organization in the country. In Indonesia, the ABRI had a strong ideological connection based on its involvement in the civil affairs of the state. The concept of "dwifungsi" (dual-function) refers to military application in the military's own areas to those more belonging to the state's bureaucratic apparatus, played a crucial role in regimes such as the one under Soeharto in Indonesia, with effects still well present in contemporary Indonesia. 

The politico-military regime in Thailand 

The military role in Thailand's political history has been a crucial element since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The country has experienced a series of military coups and political tensions that have influenced the path of democracy in this nation.

A significant period in Thai politics was when Thaksin Shinawatra came to power in the late 1990s. During those years Thailand was marked by a sharp decline in levels of democratization also due to the 1998 financial crisis and the victory of the Thai Rak Thai party, led by Thaksin, in the 2001 elections. This victory created social divisions that sparked conflicts between pro-monarchy groups, such as the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), and pro-democracy groups, such as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). Political tensions led to the first military coup in 2006, which saw the direct intervention of the military to stop the electoral process that would return Thaksin to power. These social conflicts hampered political stability and elections for several years. Only in 2011, through an agreement between anti-regime groups, the military and the monarchy, did Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's sister, become prime minister. The political crisis of 2013-2014, including anti-government Shinawatra protests and the emergence of movements such as the pro-monarchy People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), led to the dissolution of parliament and early elections. However, elections were not held because of the military coup by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), led by General Prayuth Chan-o-Cha. Thailand remained under military rule until 2019.

It is important to note that the 2014 coup was different from the 2006 coup because of the strong military involvement in the government and the 2017 constitutional changes that gave significant advantages to the military in the prime ministerial elections. This reflects the evolution of the military's role in Thailand's political process. This significant role of the military is still evident in the 2019 and 2023 general elections, where the selection of the prime minister continues to depend on the Senate, composed of members who are not directly elected, many of whom come from the armed forces and police. This reflects the persistence of the strong military role in Thai politics and the complexity of the political landscape in this country.

The military regime in Myanmar

Analysis of political and economic development in Myanmar reveals a complex and interesting picture worthy of further study. Since the 1962 coup, during which U Nu's government was overthrown by the military, the action was seen as a response to U Nu's economic policies considered a betrayal of socialist principles. This assessment stemmed from the perception that the economic measures taken by the U Nu government were at odds with the ideological foundations of the regime, based on socialism that led Myanmar went through a political transformation based on a one-party regime controlled by the military.

During this period, the military played a significant role in controlling the economic aspects of the country. Today, Myanmar's political history has become further complicated with a series of events that have left the country lagging behind, both in terms of development and political participation, compared to the rest of Southeast Asia.

Political instability and a series of military coups have been factors that have hindered the process of economic development in Myanmar. However, the lens through which to view the slow pace of this development should be broader, including an understanding of why there is military intervention. The comparison with Thailand offers an interesting analogy. Although both have suffered the same number of coups, Thailand has experienced much more robust economic development than Myanmar.

The role of the military in the two countries has different dynamics. In Thailand, the military role has shifted from "janitor" to "ruler," especially after the coup and the 2019 elections. In contrast, in Myanmar, the military maintains a "praetorian" position, especially after 2011 and the 2021 coup. This indicates a direct intervention of the military in the political processes and development of the country. These conditions are not only influenced by the military role, but also by the significant contribution of elites, especially during the government of Aung San Suu Kyi. This government reflects a failure in various aspects of Myanmar's domestic political policies, especially with regard to the serious issues of genocide involving the Rohingya ethnic group.

Conclusion 

The military role in regime management, particularly in the post-World War II period, has been the main focus in theoretical policy analysis. It is important to note that the military role is not monolithic, and variations in this role are clearly evident in the Southeast Asian context. For example, in Indonesia and Thailand, the armed forces not only play the role of security maintainers, but also act as governors (Thailand) or semi-governors. At the same time, in Myanmar, the military role is purely praetorian in nature, manifesting a propensity to preserve the status quo without any substantive dialogue with the opposition. This decision reflects a strong determination to keep policy in line with the vision and interests held by the Myanmar Armed Forces.