Asean

Sabrina Moles published in Asean, Politics and strategy

East Timor – a post-electoral overview with ASEAN on the horizon

Citizens of the youngest Asian democracy have chosen Ramos-Horta as their new leader. This is a return for the Nobel laureate who wants to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

East Timor has chosen its President: José Ramos-Horta, Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1996 and a key figure in the Indonesian resistance to occupation (1975-1999). Former president between 2007 and 2012, Ramos-Horta challenged the incumbent president Francisco “Lu Olo” Guterres to the second round of elections. It is the fifth election for one of the youngest democracies in Asia, and the first in the post-pandemic era. Therefore, the challenges that the new administration will have to face are not few, amidst the economic crisis and new political turbulence in the region.

Elections in East Timor: an overview

East Timor, also known as Timor Leste or Timor Lorosa-e, is the first Asian democracy to enter the 21st century. The Portuguese colonial rule lasted about 400 years until independence, declared in 1975. An independence lasted only few weeks, until 7th December of the same year. The emerging political leadership had gradually formed around the socialist independence forces. Enough to justify Indonesian President Suharto’s order to invade the country to fight Communism, which led to the violent oppression of the local population. In 1999, a referendum supervised by the United Nations confirmed the demand for autonomy by the citizens of East Timor. It was only in 2002 that official independence came, after almost three years of repercussions by the occupation forces.

The twentieth anniversary of independence - May 20, 2022 - will be the day of the beginning of the new presidency. The election of Ramos-Horta confirms the prevalence of key figures of the Resistance in the political landscape of East Timor. An interesting outcome in country where only about 33% of the population is over 30 years old. In fact, most of the 1.3 million citizens have only a limited experience of the violence of the occupation years. Much more familiar to many East Timorese is a stagnant economy and a challenging labor market. Living conditions have slowly improved over the last decade, but 42% of the population still lives in a state of poverty. The economic system is exposed to external shocks as it rests on a few vital sectors. Outside of international aid, most of the revenue depends on gas and oil, which make up 90% of total exports (and involve Italian companies such as Eni). Coffee is also a commodity that brings wealth to the country, but not enough to stabilize a labor market largely linked to the informal economy.

The future of East Timor and ASEAN

At the dawn of the election as the new president of East Timor, José Ramos-Horta referred to the goal of East Timor's entry into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by 2023. A promise made for the first time over ten years ago during the first mandate, when Dili's candidacy for joining the group was officially submitted. Next year, the current presidency will pass to Indonesia and, as the newly elected president says, joining ASEAN on this occasion "would be a highly symbolic gesture". East Timor’s entry into the bloc has been postponed several times because some member countries consider its economy still "too underdeveloped".

The ASEAN countries that have most intertwined relations with Dili are Cambodia and the Philippines. Manila is often associated with East Timor as the "big sister" among the (few) realities of the Catholic faith in Asia. The Philippine armed forces have also been involved in East Timorese affairs since the transition to an independent republic and contribute to the training of the army, along with Portugal, Brazil and - to a small extent - the United States. Phnom Penh has a partial influence on East Timorese foreign policy: in recent years Dili has sought the favors of Cambodia in view of the ASEAN presidency in 2022, but also the common bond with China has often favored the alignment of the two countries in different international issues (most recently, Phnom Penh pushed for Dili's abstention from the UN vote to condemn the coup in Myanmar).

The relationship with China is one of the keys to understanding the importance of Dili on the Asian chessboard. Like other small economies in the region, investments from Beijing represent a key growth opportunity. Opportunity that part of the ASEAN bloc itself would favor in order not to bear the costs of East Timor's development. However, the situation is much more complex due to the PRC increasingly approach towards small and poor-stricken countries in the area. A signal, according to analysts, that may trigger a security dilemma in the region. China was the first country to initiate diplomatic relations with the country in 2002 and has since contributed largely to the investments needed for economic recovery. Much infrastructure in East Timor is the work of Chinese companies (including government buildings and some military structures). And the opportunities did not end with the reconstruction: the entire port system must be strengthened to open the country to international trade, while there are still many oil and gas basins that have not yet been discovered and exploited. Finally, an increasingly determining factor in East Timor's fate will be climate change. The country is subject to extreme climatic phenomena which are intensifying over the years. The government alone does not have the resources to prevent and repair the damage that floods, earthquakes and landslides cause to the economy and society. Three quarters of the population depend on subsistence agriculture: this will therefore mean greater vulnerability to the limits of survival. And, therefore, growing risks in terms of economic and political independence.

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Redazione published in Asean, Economy and trade

India - ASEAN cooperation: Regional Implications

The possibilities for cooperation between New Delhi and Southeast Asian countries are numerous. So is the potential for deepening the relationship.

By Aishwarya Nautiyal

With the emergence of Indian economic development and influence, one of the major focus of the policy makers has been on “Look East Policy” in which ASEAN has become a primary collaborative organization for implementing India’s trade, security and economic interests. One of the major agreements was the “Free Trade Agreement” which was signed by India and ASEAN in 2009, in Bali Indonesia. Changing global dynamics and the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific region brings this partnership as a core central focus point for stability and building sustainable coordination in a globalized world. A group of ten nations with variation in economic growth and abundance of resources have paved a way with 90% of tariff liberalization making it one of the largest FTAs in the world inclusive of some privileged products like palm oil, tea, coffee.

With India’s forecast of exporting 46$ billion in Financial Year 22 which is among the largest trading regions in meeting its target of 400$ billion globally. The main cooperation comes from the field of engineering where ASEAN holds 15% of share in Indian engineering exports which was recorded at 35.3$ billion in 2021 and with a new fiscal target of 105$billion in 2022. In the global scenario this cooperation is becoming an important value supply chain focused upon mutual partnership and export markets. ASEAN itself is positioned with the third largest exporting partner to India and fifth biggest trade partner. While looking at the rising interaction between two partners some alarm bells have been raised among Indian policy makers where it has been seen as tariff reduction is bringing larger participation of ASEAN in Indian markets compared to India’s participation in competitive markets of ASEAN economies. This is due to some of the major countries like Singapore, Malaysia & Indonesia being export driven economies with competitive advantage with higher export GDP ratio.

Kerala is one of the major exporters including domestic exports of plantation products. Rubber, coffee, fish being the largest source of income whereas lower productivity due to rising imports at competitive pricing is affecting its farming industry. One of the major hindrances can be seen with cheaper import of fish, rubber & palm oil from Malaysia & Indonesia which has already impacted local production and decline in its demand. Rising competition with the ASEAN imports has brought up certain challenges to the governance where they find it a mammoth task to keep the balance between local cultivation and trade liberalization. Another major challenge lies towards variation in ASEAN economic and political stability. Myanmar, which has seen a prolonged political turmoil and its borders with India have brought up new challenges concerning an alarm in New Delhi’s vision in South East Asia.

Another challenge that this cooperation has faced is the boycott of Malaysian palm oil export to India by traders which brought a huge concern among the member nations. Malaysia was seen by Indian policymakers with deliberate interference to its domestic affairs when the government of India revoked Kashmir’s special status in 2019. During this period Malaysian Prime Minister’s Mahathir Mohamad statement opposing the revocation brought a new rift due to which India imposed restrictions on palm oil imports from Malaysia. These political dynamics and certain flare up issues highlights one important aspect to be focused upon where large diplomatic coordination to implement major confidence building measures. Nevertheless, challenges and strategic interests have emerged and negotiations with multilateral dialogues are making sure new setups are placed to deal with such issues. Increasing importance of ASEAN and Indian Ocean brings up new avenues where disputes in the Pacific can be seen as a new focal point of enhancing strategic partnership and rectifying security dynamics.

The Malacca dilemma is one of the core aspects in which the Andaman & Nicobar islands (India) is placed strategically near the major trading route of Strait of Malacca sharing its geographic location with the key economies such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, this makes India having maritime boundary with neighboring ASEAN countries. In recent years mutual cooperation has emerged in various fields of defense sectors including military exercises, defense technological development, arms trade and mutual infrastructure development. Malacca strait being one of the important trading routes which is located under supervision of regional states where mutual collaborations are promoted to ensure free navigation of international trading in accordance with international laws, also to promote and explore new business avenues in changing and challenging geopolitical scenarios. On the other hand India’s defense cooperation with Vietnam and first sale of supersonic Brahmos missiles to Philippines with participation of Tejas fighter jets for Malaysian Air Force is looked upon building trust in various dynamics of strategic and security cooperation sharing mutual concerns over regional disputes.

Strengthening multi-faceted relationship from political and security cooperation to social, cultural and lingual participation includes India’s new vision of “Act East Forum” for its north eastern states and its infrastructure development with the help of Japanese investments targeting its connectivity to neighboring ASEAN countries. Sittwe port in Rakhine province of Myanmar which has been developed aiming at infrastructure and transportation development and access to Bay of Bengal for landlocked North Eastern state of India of Mizoram and further inland. Another trilateral highway project connecting Moreh (India) via Mandalay (Myanmar) to Mae Sot (Thailand) is an example of India- ASEAN connectivity project with future plans to expand it to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. These projects have shown some interesting development from the Bangladesh government seeking an opportunity in India-ASEAN infrastructure development connecting Dhaka to boost connectivity, whereas it can also provide access to landlocked countries like Nepal and Bhutan to ASEAN members via North East India. Recognizing potential for mutual development can deepen and strengthen new avenues for the region, ensuring strong historical cultural linkage between regional partners and their rich mutual shared history.

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Emilia Leban published in Asean, Economy and trade

First steps in the management of plastic waste

By 2024, the UN and Asian countries want to achieve the first world treaty on the containment of plastic waste

80% of the world's plastic waste originates in the Asian continent and more than a third comes from the Philippines. To counter the phenomenon, the major plastic producers in Asia - from China to India, from Saudi Arabia to Japan - have participated, within the United Nations, in the drafting of a plan for the realization of the first world treaty on containment of plastic waste by 2024.

The agreement reached on March the 2nd by the UN Environment Program was defined as "a historical moment". Although the skeptics did not fail to underline the criticalities of this agreement. In fact, the treaty focuses mainly on the recycling of single-use plastics, but environmental experts continue to insist that, in order to have a significant impact, it is also necessary to deal with the limitation of the production of plastic products. A prospect that does not appeal to the governments of those nations with an economy based on the petrochemical industry.

The agreement, however, is more complex: the countries have agreed on a resolution that provides for the monitoring of plastic pollution along the entire production chain, from creation to disposal. Special attention will be paid to the Asian countries considered to be the main culprits for the dispersion of plastic waste in the environment, especially the Philippines. Malaysia, a favorite destination for many other nations for the disposal of plastics, will also be at the center of attention. 

According to some experts, making the disposal process more expensive is the only way to incentivize nations to recycle. Not surprisingly, most plastic waste comes from Southeast Asian countries, where waste disposal policies are far too lax and concentrations of plastic end up mostly burned in landfills or, directly, in the oceans.

This situation, in addition to being harmful to the environment, also translates into a substantial economic loss. A series of studies conducted by the World Bank confirms that in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines over 75% of the material value of recyclable plastic - the equivalent of six billion dollars a year - is lost when used only once. According to the UN Environment Program, between 6 and 19 billion dollars a year are spent globally on cleaning up the dirt that results from plastic pollution.

A possible solution, advocated by experts, could be the creation of recycling centers at an international level, where plastic waste can be collected. Another area of ​​interest, which the treaty should take into consideration, concerns the coordination of the strategy between different countries and regions, to smooth out the discrepancies in anti-pollution actions. Not to mention that the effects of pollution are manifested above all in the most backward geographical areas. This means that, even though this treaty has already been crowned "the greatest agreement since Paris," there is still a long way to go. 

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Valerio Bordonaro published in Asean, Culture and society

ASEAN history and politics

The first course directed by the Italy-ASEAN Association, “ASEAN History and Politics”, has begun

The first course entirely in English on "ASEAN History and Politics", organized and directed by the Italy-ASEAN Association, began last Wednesday, March 23rd, at the Italian Institute of Oriental Studies of the Sapienza University of Rome. The cycle of lectures will continue until the beginning of June and is part of the degree program in Global Humanities of the University of Rome. In the coming months, about 70 students from all over the world, from Indonesia to Japan, Africa and Europe, will address the most important issues concerning Southeast Asia: from historical to economic and geopolitical aspects, from human rights to international trade, including the digital and sustainable transition of the region. During the first lecture, the Vice President of the Italy-ASEAN Association, Professor Romeo Orlandi, made an overview of the history of the Association, from its foundation to the challenges of the pandemic and those we will face in the next years, making a thorough analysis of the peculiar aspects in each country. In the next lectures, students will have the opportunity to listen to the testimonies of some of the ASEAN Ambassadors to Italy as well as several analysts from the Southeast Asian region; they will also discuss the main topics concerning Southeast Asia through workshops and presentations that will allow them to observe firsthand the heart of the problems. This course will be another important opportunity to improve the degree of knowledge and perception of ASEAN in Italy. The Italy-ASEAN Association has been working towards this goal since its foundation and believes it is essential to better raise public awareness in universities and decision makers on a region of the world with which we share many common interests.

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Fabrizia Candido published in Asean, Economy and trade

Femtech: a rising trend in ASEAN

Femtech — a category of software, products or services that use technology to improve women's health — was born as a response to the conscious need for information, specific treatments and health support of women around the world. In the Asia-Pacific region, where often topics such as abortion, period and menopause are still considered taboo, this sector is growing rapidly, with Singapore leading the trend.

Women account for half of the world's population, yet technology companies that cater to their specific health needs cover just a tiny share of the global tech market. Yan Li, professor of Digital Transformation at the ESSEC Asia-Pacific Business School in Singapore, argues that women's health has historically been disregarded not only by governments but also by the medical industry. In an interview to Nikkei Asia, she said that "women's healthcare is considered a niche industry. Many drug studies are not even tested on female subjects so women are more likely to suffer an accidental overdose." Yan Li's claims are also reflected in a study published in the British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology in 2018: women make up for only 22% of subjects involved in Phase 1 drug trials.

The term 'femtech' was first coined in 2016 by Ida Tin, founder of Clue — an ovulation and period-tracking app — and indicates any software, product or service that uses technology to improve women's health. It is a response to the conscious need for information, specific treatments and health support of women around the world.

In 2019, the femtech industry generated $820.6 million in global revenues and received $592 million in venture capital investments according to PitchBook, a financial research and data company. A large number of apps and tech companies have entered the market to address women's specific needs, including menstrual and fertility monitoring, solutions for pregnancy, breastfeeding and menopause, as well as developing specific programs for diagnosing and monitoring illnesses such as breast or cervical cancer.

In May 2021, a New York Times article was titled Is 'Femtech' the Next Big Thing in Health Care?. In fact, the FemTech Analytics report already counted 1,550 femtech companies worldwide last year: 51.9% are located in North America, 23.5% in Europe, 13.9% in Asia, 4.7% in Australia, 4.4% in South America and 1.6% in Africa.

However, FemTech Analytics predicts that the Asia-Pacific will be the world’s fastest-growing region in the development of women's health apps by 2026. In Southeast Asia, topics such as abortion, birth control and even period have always been taboo. "There are several reasons why women's health issues are not properly addressed in this region of the world. However, the first is undoubtedly the lack of sex education, which prevents women from knowing and seeking better care of their bodies," Yan Li explained in an interview to TechWire Asia. To this day, it is a common practice for local women to stay hidden during their menstrual cycle. For example, in some communities in Laos, Nepal or Indonesia, menstruation is considered impure or dirty; this makes it difficult for women to go to school or carry out daily chores, and virtually impossible to receive proper assistance when in need. 

But we must make a virtue out of necessity. To date, according to the latest Femtech Analytics report, there are 24 femtech companies in Singapore, 6 in Thailand, 3 in Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines and 2 in Malaysia. Sehati, founded by Indonesian Anda Waluyo, is based on the IoMT (Internet of Medical Things) and aims at providing fetal monitoring and access to specialist consultations for expectant mothers through the app; EloCare, founded in Singapore by Mabel Yen Ngoc Nguyen, monitors and collects data related to menopausal symptoms via wearable devices; ZaZaZu, also founded in Singapore by Jingjin Liu, is a platform that offers education, products and digital services related to female sexuality.

Femtech is a flourishing sector and Asian women are very enthusiastic about the birth of FemTech Asia, "a job search platform founded by young women who wish to develop their careers in Asian technology markets."

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Sabrina Moles published in Asean, Politics and strategy

Decoding ASEAN military spending

The Asia Pacific area is the new center of global dynamics, and greater interests result in greater responsibilities: an overview of security perception in the region 

The Philippines has been trying to defend sovereignty over the South China Sea since 2013. In that year, Manila officially filed a lawsuit against China in the Permanent Arbitration Court in The Hague and 3.38$ billion was expended for defense. It is one of the archipelago's largest investments in the military sector of the last decade, which peaked in 2017, when the perception of Chinese assertiveness in the region began to become more evident. But the goal was not just a preemptive move for a hypothetical conflict in the South China Sea: President Rodrigo Duterte's "war on drugs" had turned into a massive and indiscriminate campaign against organized crime, and there was a lack of means to manage it. While the international community was witnessing an escalation of violence in the country and trying to distance itself, it was the People's Republic of China who supplied the Philippines’ army.

It is not easy to analyze a state's military spending, how it is managed and what conditions it can create in foreign policy. Governments often enter arms contracts with countries that could be the very reason for improving the military arsenal and showing themselves "ready" in the event of a conflict. But there is no lack of internal reasons for not letting our guard down. This is what has been happening in Asia from the beginning of the 2000s to today, in a region that is increasingly characterizing international dynamics and interests. In this scenario, the game is being played between the major global powers, and the countries of the area can only respond by taking preventive measures: arm themselves, modernize and integrate themselves into the most advantageous dynamics of globalization. And the crises of recent years have contributed to increasing the perception of insecurity.

The Sipri report

According to the 2019 report by the Stockholm International Peace Institute (Sipri) dedicated to Southeast Asia, it is in this region that the purchase of arms and defense spending have reached the greatest surge in the last twenty years, surpassing the trends of other areas. Among the causes identified by analysts, the rise of Chinese power, but also internal conflicts or tensions along the borders. But the alarming element, the report highlights, is another: in Asia the mechanisms for managing armed conflicts and territorial disputes are lacking - or are unclear. Both the “Asean way” in international affairs and Chinese foreign policy contribute to creating this pattern, both characterized - often - by attempts to avoid direct confrontation and implicit and often cryptic attitudes. The most exemplary case remains precisely that of the South China Sea, where not only the movements of military vehicles, but also the exploration of gas and mineral deposits, or illegal fishing, take place indiscriminately despite the countries having ratified the United Nations Convention. on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) - and despite the promise of a "code of conduct" soon.

Going into detail, the military spending of the ten ASEAN countries increased by 33% between 2008 and 2017, even if the reasons behind this choice are different. The countries involved in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are the ones that have increased investments the most: a response to the unilateral actions considered "suspicious" by Chinese ships and planes. In the other cases, however, the concern and uncertainty towards the neighborhood and the porosity of the borders, which favor the movement of rebel groups, are no less evident: this is what is declared in most contracts for the import of arms, citing the fight against terrorism, organized crime and the transfer of advanced technologies to improve the quality of military operations. Recent cases of inefficiency of military assets, such as the dramatic loss of the crew of the Indonesian Indonesian submarine KRI Nanggala-402, have also raised concerns over equipment modernization.

Exporters and importers

After an initial phase of dependence on the US, Russia, or China, in recent years Asian countries have begun to diversify their suppliers of weapons and military technologies. Today, Sipri data confirm, a significant part of the arms trade flows to Asian markets. This is where 37% of exports from the US, the largest arms exporter in the world, come in, as well as 55% of those from Russia, albeit in decline. Other important exporters are Japan and South Korea, while India occupies a small share of the Burmese market - which with the arrival of the military junta in power seeks to reduce the dependence it has matured towards Beijing.

In Malaysia, in addition to Korea, arms imports from Spain and Turkey play an important role. France does not represent a key player as an arms exporter but, with the growth of international interests in Asian waters, seeks to play a role in monitoring and exercise operations: the latest case dates to the 2021 operations in the Indian Ocean as part of the of the Quad chord. The fledgling alliance desired by the Biden administration is, however, fragile: an element that contributes to influencing the perception of security in Asia.

Cold tensions and new threats

Although Asia has a low percentage of conflicts, concentrated mainly within the countries themselves, there is no lack of conditions for an escalation of tensions in some hotspots of the region. To name a few: the dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over exploitation of the common stretch of sea, the claims of Cambodia and Thailand along the border and the claims of the Philippines on the (now Malaysian) district of Sabah.

Finally, with a view to renewing the defense, the role of global crises is no less important. One such factor is the growing presence of Washington and allies in the Pacific to monitor the region as China's containment practice. The conflict in Ukraine also raises new questions (or rather concerns) on the evolution of global relations: on the one hand, sanctions against Russia represent an unexpected event for countries that receive assistance and weapons from Moscow (such as Vietnam and Myanmar), on the other, Kiev itself exports a small part of weapons (in particular, missiles) to Vietnam and Thailand. Ultimately, the diplomatic impasse and the violence of the conflict could not only increase uncertainty about one's own military capabilities and resources, but also open up the possibility of the international community’s powerlessness to intervene on the ground.

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Michelle Cabula published in Asean, Culture and society

Record drought in the Mekong basin: how to mitigate environmental risks

The Mekong is one of the longest rivers on the Asian continent and represents not only a vital source of livelihood for the populations living in its basin area, but also an object of contention between local governments. ASEAN can play a key role in promoting regional cooperation and dialogue with China.

The Mekong originates on the Tibetan plateau in China and winds for more than 4000 kilometers through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam before flowing into a large delta in the South China Sea. The river plays a key role in the South-East Asia region: not only the livelihood of over 60 million people, but also regional geopolitical balances are dependent on its water.

For the fourth consecutive year, the region is facing a water emergency that, in addition to suffering from the worsening climate crisis, reflects the conflictuality characterizing the policies of flow management. The Mekong River Commission (MRC) - an intergovernmental organization that brings together Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, the four countries of the lower river basin – has mentioned "regional low flows, water fluctuations, and droughts" among the risks that local authorities are called upon to address urgently. The Cambodian government has announced that rainfall in the rainy season "will not be enough to meet the immediate needs" and has recommended a thrifty use of valuable water resources, especially in rural areas.

As highlighted in the latest report of the Mekong River Commission published in early January, the significant anomalies that have affected the hydrological regime since 2015 are the result of the dangerous combination of natural hazards and anthropic pressure. The scarcity of rainfall is added to the intensive exploitation of water, exacerbating the devastating impact on ecosystems, economic activities and the livelihood of local populations.

According to a joint study carried out by the Stimson Center and the research company Eyes on Earth, in some areas of the Mekong basin "the impoundment of water and unnatural releases from dams have entirely altered the natural flow of the river". Water is in fact retained by storage systems during the wet season, while flows increase relatively in the dry season, when the water level is too low to make a difference.

The competition for the control of the flows of the Mekong is made manifest by the number of dams that continue to arise along its path: eleven main ones, most of which are located in Chinese territory, to which must be added the hundreds of minor buildings built along the tributaries and used for fishing and agriculture. Since the 1990s, Beijing has been engaged in an ambitious hydroelectric project that has resulted in the construction of dams and power plants along the upper reaches of the river in the southern province of Yunnan. In addition, through the granting of substantial funding, the Chinese authorities have supported the ambitions of the Laotian neighbour, which has not made a secret of wanting to focus on hydropower to become the "battery of Asia" and relaunch its economy.

In response to the increasing risks - with river levels reaching the lowest levels ever recorded in the last 60 years - the Mekong River Commission invites the six countries involved "to take bold actions" and suggests the establishment of a common notification mechanism on abnormal water level fluctuations and a coordinated system for the management of reservoirs and dams.

Although China has denied the allegations of taking advantage of the strategic position upstream of the river to unilaterally capitalise common waters and exert political pressure on neighbouring countries, the reluctance to share data on the management of dams and the same absence within the Mekong River Commission highlight the persistence of political and diplomatic tensions that undermine regional cooperation on resource management.

According to experts from the Stimson Center and Eyes on Earth, the best solution would be an international water sharing agreement that guarantees "a baseline level of flow from upstream dams during periods of drought” with the aim of averting future crises and simultaneously mitigating distrust of China. In this context, closer synergy between the MRC and ASEAN secretariats is needed. In fact, the Organization can contribute to giving greater centrality to the project of sustainable and coordinated management of the Mekong within the regional political agenda. At the same time, the role of ASEAN in promoting a shared and sustainable development path with the participation of China remains crucial. Hopefully, Beijing will not remain indifferent for a long time to the mutual advantages that a peaceful coexistence along the most productive river in the region could offer.

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Emilia Leban published in Asean, Culture and society

The boom of coffee in Asian markets

Almost one third of world coffee production comes from the Asian continent

There is a new trend that has spread all over Asia. A drink that is a symbol of taste and refinement, but also of Western influence in the region. We are talking about coffee. In the last five years, the consumption of coffee in Asian countries has grown by 1.5%; a trend that follows the rise of the middle class, eager to always try new products. But it is also a very extensive cultural phenomenon, which derives from colonialism and is intertwined with today's trends that come from the West. In China, for example, the taste for this drink is handed down above all by people who have studied or worked abroad. However, the pandemic has considerably reduced travelling, and coffee lovers started to be fascinated by the local varieties of the drink. Not surprisingly, in the last couple of years, Asian coffee producers are starting to rival big Western industries, such as Starbucks and Costa. And today 29% of coffee beans in the world come from the Asian continent.

Among the main coffee producers there is Vietnam, a real giant of the industry. Ever since the French colonizers first harvested "crimson cherries'' - as coffee beans were nicknamed - this drink has remained part of the Vietnamese tradition. Like for us, in Italy, in Vietnam "going out for a coffee" is a method to socialize. Social networks such as TikTok have drived the interest of the masses for coffee, involving an increasingly wider audience: from young people who want Starbucks-model frappuccini to "expert" consumers, intrigued by the procedures for preparing and roasting the beans. If before the pandemic the main objective was exports, today it has been realized that domestic consumption is just as important.

Indonesia, the second largest producer of coffee in the region, has also seen an increase in local sales in recent years. Local variants are also very popular, such as Kopi Susu, an iced coffee with milk and palm sugar. Coffee, effectively distributed even during the pandemic with delivery services, has never stopped circulating, attracting more and more admirers and onlookers, eager to support local products rather than consume foreign brands. Not to mention that 90% of Indonesians are Muslim, and therefore looking for a social drink that does not contain alcohol.

China is having a similar experience. The arrival of foreign chains such as Starbucks and Costa Coffee in the late 90's triggered coffee culture in the metropolis, attracting young consumers. But with the start of local chains and street kiosks in recent years, public interest has shifted to the consumption of local products. A choice derived not only from the pandemic, but also from trade tensions with the United States. According to a March 2021 report by the financial newspaper Yicai, Shanghai now has the largest number of independent coffee shops in the world, with 6,913 outlets. More than 3,826 in Tokyo, 3,233 in London and 1,591 in New York. Also in this case it was young people, especially those who studied abroad, to import the coffee fashion. 

In Japan, tea no longer reigns supreme. The Japanese coffee market is the largest on the Asian continent, with sales exceeding $ 24 billion in 2020. In contrast, tea consumption is decreasing. According to the Japanese Association for the production of tea, the consumption of the drink fell to 108,454 tons in 2019. A decrease of 30% compared to 2004. It is mainly women who have approached coffee. The arrival of "Western" cafes, where smoking is prohibited, has in fact attracted many young customers, previously discouraged by the traditional and smoky Japanese cafes. The pandemic also increased the demand for machines and equipment for making coffee at home.

In South Korea, coffee has become an integral part of the social ecosystem. The market includes consumers of all ages and backgrounds and is aimed above all at those who have made coffee shops their second homes: people who, in addition to sipping a coffee, sit at tables to study, work and talk with friends. And coffee culture is expected to become even more entrenched in South Korea as it is in all of Asia. With the expansion of the middle class, the number of people exposed to a Western lifestyle will increase, bringing the tradition of coffee into their own homes.

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Agnese Ranaldi published in Asean, Politics and strategy

The war in Ukraine has some repercussions on South-East Asian countries

ASEAN is exposed, to varying degrees, to sanctions aimed at the Russian economy. Energy, grain and investment are the sectors where these relations mainly intersect

While much of the "Western" world looks at the developments in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict condemning Moscow with severe economic sanctions, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have taken an uneven stance. According to some observers, the delay in issuing statements on the crisis and the lack of explicit condemnation of Russia by ASEAN are the symptoms of the difficulty encountered by the regional actors in finding synthesis between their bilateral relations with Russia. Singapore and Myanmar, as an instance, condense the bloc's divisions, one explicitly condemning Moscow's actions, the other expressing support. The reasons for these contradictions are to be found in the historical and commercial ties that unite the fortunes of South-East Asia with those of Russia.

The ASEAN bloc is exposed, to varying degrees, to sanctions aimed at the Russian economy. Energy, grain and investment are the main areas where these relationships intersect. According to James Guild of The Diplomat, although there is uncertainty about the impact of the conflict on Southeast Asian economies, there are some clues that can anticipate its impact. First, Russia's role as a global energy supplier worries some countries in particular. Although for Singapore only 5.7% of oil imported in 2019 is Russian, and for Thailand 3.3%, Vietnam may be more exposed to conflict-driven energy supply shocks, with 15% of coal imported in 2019 coming from Russia. Moreover, energy prices were already on the rise before the conflict broke out, and the war will only exacerbate the situation.

Global inflationary pressure on food prices could increase further, putting economies such as Indonesia and the Philippines, which imported around 25% and 16% of total grain from Russia and Ukraine respectively in 2019, in a crisis. Many Southeast Asian countries have state agencies specializing in the collection of essential commodities to cope with any shocks to supply chains, but the phenomenon of shrinking supply will still affect prices and production.

Then, several joint ventures link the fates of the ASEAN economies to that of Russia. In general, there seems to be an urgent need to break off commercial partnerships with Moscow, not least due to the practical impossibility of carrying out exchanges and transactions. A case in point is Vietnam's Long Phu 1 coal-fired power station, whose Russian contractor fears it will never receive back the money it invested in the project. The link between Moscow and Hanoi dates back to Soviet times and was mainly centered on the supply of defense equipment by Russia, which dominates 60% of Vietnam's military imports. Although Vietnam has not condemned the Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory, international sanctions could jeopardize economic relations with the historic communist ally as well.

Russia had patiently carved out room of influence over the Southeast Asian region. Beyond the primacy in arms supply, the 'turn to the East' policy was an explicit recognition of how much Russian President Vladimir Putin valued relations with regional actors. When the 30th anniversary of official relations between Russia and ASEAN was celebrated in 2021, Putin had commended the political proximity between the sides by stressing how often the positions of the bloc's nations on issues of global significance coincide with those of Russia. Indeed, the two players have also published a comprehensive action plan to implement their strategic partnership for 2021-25, which touches on the trade, strategic and security dimensions. All this shows how Moscow has reserved specific relations with South-East Asia for itself, moving away from the other two dominant models, the US and China. Unlike Washington and Beijing - and with the exception of its controversial arms supply to Myanmar - Moscow is not directly involved in any political-diplomatic crisis in the area. For Russia and the countries of South-East Asia, economic and commercial, and sometimes ideological, ties are also a bridge of diplomatic exchange. The different postures taken by the bloc's nations stigmatize ASEAN's difficulties in claiming centrality in matters that individually touch on these historic bilateral ties.

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Pierfrancesco Mattiolo published in Asean, Economy and trade

Carbon pricing on imports to the EU is coming

Brussels wants to make its climate policies more ambitious and avoid carbon leakage by imposing the same price on imported products as on made in EU goods. What impact will the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) have on trade - and diplomatic - relations with Asia?

Although recent developments in global climate diplomacy have not been satisfactory, at the domestic level the European Union continues to implement its European Green Deal. Last July, the Commission adopted the Fit for 55 package and set ambitious targets for itself: to slash CO2 emissions by 55% before 2030 and bring them to zero by 2050, achieving carbon neutrality. One of the measures in this package is the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a tool that aims to impose the same carbon pricing on certain goods imported into the EU, as it is paid to produce the same goods in Europe under the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). To reach the Fit for 55 targets and to push European producers to green their industrial processes, Brussels will have to make its ETS more ambitious, thus exposing itself to the risk of carbon leakage. Companies could choose to stop producing goods affected by carbon pricing in Europe and buy the same goods at a lower price from third countries with less stringent climate legislation. Carbon leakage would not only damage the European economy but also make climate policies less effective, as it would push companies to shift their emissions, not reduce them.

Currently, the EU addresses the risk of carbon leakage by providing free allowances in the EU ETS, thus reducing its effectiveness. The CBAM would replace free allowances, leading to greater emission reductions in the EU through the EU ETS. It would also have effects in third countries. To avoid paying the carbon price in Europe, trading partners could either develop their own carbon pricing tool or innovate their production processes to reduce emissions, thus lowering the cost when exporting. Although CBAM is a domestic climate policy, it manages to influence international trade relations and the commitment of third countries to the Paris Agreement targets. The results are already visible, even before the final approval of the Regulation: Turkey has ratified the Paris Agreement and admitted that the CBAM, with its potential effects on Turkish exports to Europe, is one of the reasons behind this late choice.

But how exactly does the CBAM work? The Commission has been very cautious in designing the Mechanism. Over the last decade, academia and international fora have discussed at length possible forms of border adjustment mechanism, a necessary addition to the carbon pricing systems now widespread in many jurisdictions around the world. Prompted by the Paris Agreement, the EU was the first to develop this instrument, setting a model for other countries interested in developing similar schemes - Canada, the United States and Japan have expressed their willingness to develop their own CBAMs and cooperate with the EU on the issue; the the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has expressed its support for the European measure, in the hope for an international agreement on the issue. With the CBAM, Brussels has repeated what it did almost two decades ago with the EU ETS - an instrument that was itself the result of a long debate arising from an international agreement, the Kyoto Protocol - and confirmed itself as the global standard-setter for climate policy. However, there are some drawbacks in being the global standard-setter: measures that impose higher costs on the import of goods are never appreciated by trading partners, particularly those who are most affected - or who think they are affected, as we will see - and are often the subject of legal action at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In line with the EU’s commitment to multilateralism, compatibility with WTO obligations was the cornerstone of the CBAM proposal. Analysing the Commission's text, there appears to be no discrimination that could be sanctioned by the WTO: imported goods are subject to a regime that mirrors that in force for European products under the ETS. Moreover, the carbon price possibly paid in the country of origin of the good is taken into account and deducted from the amount to be paid to the EU. The free allowances in the EU ETS will be gradually reduced, reflecting the gradual entry into force of the CBAM. At present, the sectors covered by the measure are cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers and electricity. In the second phase, the scope of the CBAM will be extended to other sectors.

Notwithstanding its compliance with WTO law, the CBAM could still be challenged by countries that consider themselves unduly affected. Critics of the measure speak of 'green protectionism' to shield European companies from external competition. If, on the one hand, such an assessment seems excessive - the CBAM does not favour European companies but rather reduces the advantage that foreign producers derive from weak climate policies by their governments - on the other hand, cooperation is indeed a more effective tool of climate diplomacy than unilateral actions. Ideally, a global carbon price would be much more effective than a multitude of systems, each one with its own CBAM, as the IMF has noted. The European proposal has the merit of making the debate on this type of measure more concrete. 

The German Konrad Adenauer Foundation mapped the position of Asian countries and their stakeholders on the CBAM prior to the publication of the Commission's proposal in July 2021. The stances appear very different. Within ASEAN, Singapore and Thailand do not express particular concerns, while Malaysia and Indonesia are more critical. Not surprisingly, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta's imports have already been affected by EU environmental policy in the past - the famous palm oil dispute - and the two countries may struggle to develop a carbon pricing system to reduce CBAM compliance. Looking at the data on trade flows between the two blocs, none of the sectors covered by the CBAM is particularly relevant for ASEAN countries' exports to the EU - except for Malaysia perhaps, but still to a small extent. The problem does not seem to be the actual impact of the measure, but a lack of trust by the stakeholders of these two countries towards EU environmental policy. Brussels could overcome these doubts by supporting green transition and cooperating with local governments on climate policy.

In India and China, too, the EU's next steps will be important to ensure that a positive perception of the CBAM prevails. New Delhi is currently the only G20 government on track to meet its emissions targets, has already developed carbon pricing tools and its companies active in the sectors covered by the CBAM employ advanced and efficient production methods. These factors make it likely that the CBAM will positively affect India's exports to the EU, helped by less competition from countries with less advanced climate policies and industrial processes. However, the above-mentioned Konrad Adenauer Foundation report shows that a majority of Indian stakeholders are particularly critical of the CBAM and consider the measure incompatible with international climate law and WTO rules, as well as 'punitive' towards developing countries. By contrast, China has not expressed a negative stance towards the CBAM. It may be due to the ongoing cooperation with the EU to develop an ambitious Chinese ETS. If cooperation continues to be fruitful, the CBAM will ultimately benefit Chinese exporters rather than disadvantage them. Indeed, Beijing expects its climate efforts to be recognised by Brussels and its companies not to be negatively affected by the CBAM. If China's willingness to cooperate on the measure was to be disregarded on the European side, the risk of WTO legal action would re-emerge. In conclusion, the EU needs to commit to cooperation with its partners to avoid the CBAM appearing as a unilateral imposition restricting international trade.

While discontent in the countries we have mentioned can be easily addressed and overcome, it is not so easy to address the concerns of low-income countries, which lack the capacity to develop carbon pricing instruments and the resources to embark on their own ecological transition. The CBAM would mainly affect their products. As it emerges from the Impact Assessment Report of the proposal, Brussels is aware of this risk and intends to increase its efforts to support these endeavours. Still, the EU and other rich countries have yet to deliver on their climate finance promises. Perhaps the revenues of the CBAM itself could be used to finance cooperation between the EU and these countries to achieve the Paris goals.

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Clara Lomonaco published in Asean, Global Lens

Africa: from "Dark Continent" to "Goldmine"

Not only China. A number of Asian countries are betting heavily on the African continent in terms of investments and commercial and diplomatic cooperation. An overview

China’s interest in the African continent has increased exponentially over the last 20 years, but its roots go back to 1955.

In order to better understand current events, we must take a short trip to the past. Historians usually divide the Sino-African relationship into different phases. The first approach dates back to the early 1950s, a period when the PRC funded construction projects and gave its support to several independence movements. The 1980s saw the beginning of the second phase, which was mostly negative and deteriorated the relationship because China adopted a policy of isolation. It was the period when the Chinese government started to abandon Maoism (an ideology based on the collectivization of resources) in favor of a capitalistic approach (labeled as temporary and necessary to achieve an ideal Communist regime), which would be decisive in subsequent Sino-African relations. China’s wish to help the Third World, crushed by colonialism and the Western model, is linked to its intention to promote an alternative model.

The 1990s saw a progressive intensification of relations and an "updated" approach from China, in contrast with the one of half a century earlier: China expanded its scope of action, including various sectors such as trade, investment, general assistance, transfer of skills and training. The PRC spread its activities in both the public and private sector. 

The new millennium ushered in another quick and steady phase of growth. 2013 in particular was a landmark year as China overtook the USA in becoming the lead investor in Africa. 

Looking at the figures, the global trading volume between China and Africa has increased by 24.7% and loans from China have reached 153 billion in the last 20 years. 

So that begs the question, what were China’s main investments?

  1. Raw materials: Africa possesses the raw materials needed by the PRC, especially for the manufacturing sector. It should be remembered that China has gone from being a major agricultural economy to the world’s largest importer of agricultural products in the last 30 years, which earned it the title of "low-cost" country for labor cost.
  2. Market: the African market is considered particularly attractive by Chinese investors both for its extension and recent liberalization, two important factors that limit the strength and consolidation of foreign actors, thus weakening competition and facilitating market entry. 

The modus operandi of Chinese investments is based on reciprocity and in this it differs from the Western model. The North of the world used its investments to facilitate its own interests without aiming at the improvement of local conditions. On the contrary, the Chinese approach was all-encompassing and win-win: China made available to partners the same wealth of knowledge that had helped the country in its development.

Is the People's Republic of China the only Asian country that has an economic presence in Africa? 

The Land of the Rising Sun disagrees with that. The masterpiece of Japanese diplomacy in Africa has a name: Ticad. This acronym, which stands for Tokyo International Conference on African Development, indicates a series of summits organized by the Japanese government and the UN since 1993. These summits are attended by more than 40 African heads of state and have always been held in Japan except in 2016. Ticad has laid the foundations for projects "of the African people", in which Japan plays the role of facilitator through investments and know-how: many technical and commercial agreements with Tokyo were signed during these conferences, which are still today a powerful propaganda tool for Japan’s foreign policy.

The numbers speak for themselves: between 2007 and 2017, Japan's foreign direct investment in Africa increased from 3.9 to 10 billion dollars. According to Shigeru Ushio, head of the African Affairs Department of Japan's Foreign Ministry, access to African markets is vital for Japanese companies and African start-ups as it facilitates their development thanks to less bureaucratic legislations. 

Infrastructures were Japan’s starting point. The Japanese government began its activities in Africa by developing ambitious projects on a supra-regional scale. A prime example is the port of Mombasa, an asset of paramount importance since it is the terminus of the transcontinental Inter-African Highway 8, which will connect Lagos, Nigeria, to Mombasa, Kenya. The entire project is managed by Toyo Construction Co., which is by no means the only Japanese company operating in the region. According to the Overseas Construction Association of Japan, as many as 16 Japanese construction companies are active in 22 African countries. 

But Japan went beyond the infrastructure sector. Its horizons are much broader and quickly expanded to import-export markets and new technologies, with 796 Japanese companies active in Africa in 2017. Some of these, like the Nippon Biodiesel Fuel start-up in Mozambique, created a solid network of suppliers and farmers linked directly to their activities. 

The mining and energy sector has certainly been a resounding success for Japan, as evidenced by the presence of headquarters of the most important Japanese corporations like Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corp. which is in charge of oil prospecting in Kenya and natural gas development in Mozambique. 

“Three’s a crowd”: India joins China and Japan.

Growing commercial needs led India to look at Africa as an increasingly important economic partner and to reinvigorate its naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean as a means to ensure trade security.

Specifically, the Horn of Africa is extremely important for the security of New Delhi as it is located at the northwestern end of the Indian Ocean. Historically, the port of Adulis, near Massawa, has been a central hub for maritime trade between Europe and Asia, frequented also by many Indian traders. Stability in the Horn of Africa was already a priority at the time of the British Empire because it would ensure security and economic prosperity in Colonial India. After becoming independent in 1947, India adopted a strategy of military isolationism that limited the spread of its regional influence. In the 1990s and early 2000s, in concomitance with India's economic boom, domestic demand for raw materials needed to fuel growth increased exponentially. All these factors contributed to the creation of a dynamic environment and to the need for energy diversification. From that moment on, Indian investors started to take into consideration the opportunities offered by the African continent.

The Indian approach in Africa is based on mutual respect and non-interference within the framework of South-South cooperation. In the Horn, India is helping the countries most in need through development aid aimed primarily at the agricultural, health and education sectors. All countries in the region are partners in India's Pan African e-Network project, an initiative launched in 2009 by the New Delhi government and aimed at sharing Indian expertise in the fields of health and education with African countries.

Indian activities in Africa are not limited to humanitarian aid: the government seeks to satisfy its own needs for energy and food security, fundamental for the country's economic and demographic growth, as well as to take advantage of emerging business and investment opportunities. New Delhi is supported by the entrepreneurial community and big private companies. Between 2000 and 2014, bilateral trade grew from $10.5 billion to $78 billion thanks to Indian exports: electrical equipment and other machinery, pharmaceuticals, food, manufactured goods. 

In summary, China's leading role as an investor in Africa is constantly challenged by the competition of India and Japan. India’s influence in the continent is growing: on one hand, it helps the Indian government to have a wider role in international relations, and on the other hand it satisfies the raw materials needs of a rapidly growing economy. The Japanese government is aware that Japan-Africa relations are crucial for the protection of maritime trade routes because the oil imported by Tokyo from the Middle East is transported along the African coast. This goes to show that despite their rivalry, there is some convergence: having a strong economic presence in the African continent is a priority for China as much as for India and Japan.

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Redazione published in Asean, Economy and trade

Alternative Asian space ambitions

From some of the oldest space programs in the world (Indonesia) to countries with very limited experience even in satellite data applications (Cambodia), from purely academic and commercial national efforts (Singapore) to strong government-controlled programs (Vietnam): ASEAN member countries cover the full spectrum of possible cases when it comes to space programs, with clear ambitions that are functional to their own development.

Article written by Fabrizia Candido

Given the vastly different levels of space industries in the region, it is not surprising that there are no space priorities at the top of the Association's agenda. Not only does space spending and the state of infrastructure readiness vary from country to country, but there are still members that lack specialized agencies for space issues.

Thus, international cooperation plays a key role in the development of space programs of ASEAN countries. Cooperation is sought with more experienced nations that have financial resources and technical expertise, and are willing to support the programs of countries with lesser capabilities. Since there are no established space powers in the Southeast Asian region, it is essential that these countries look a little further afield, more specifically to the United States, Japan, India, and China for funds, technology, and training.

Southeast Asia's "space race" has more scaled-down but no less important goals: ensuring that natural resources are not wasted and avoiding potential environmental disasters. Based on the ASEAN Action Plan for Science, Technology and Innovation 2016-2025, the Association is currently halfway through its journey toward improving capabilities in three priority areas: geoinformatics (e.g., remote sensing, GNSS, GIS), space technology applications (e.g., disaster risk reduction, environmental and resource monitoring, communications), and satellites (e.g., nano, micro, and small satellites, etc.).

A clear example comes from Myanmar. It would seem an unusual time to focus on sending satellites into space while civil conflicts rage and COVID-19 continues to spread. However, Burma's space program, developed in collaboration with Hokkaido University and Tohuku University in Japan, aims to improve connectivity, mitigate the impact of natural disasters, and increase agricultural production. And here's how: in August 2019, Myanmar-sat2 was launched to provide improved video and broadband distribution services. With the new satellite, and future satellites, Myanmar will no longer have to pay an estimated $10 (or more) million per year to rent satellite channels from China, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. This will make it possible, for example, to show farmers what is happening to crops in fields that can be difficult to reach at certain times of the year. They would also alert authorities to changes or disruptions in remote areas that would otherwise go unnoticed, allowing illegal practices such as logging or mining to be tackled before serious damage is done to the local environment. But, primarily, satellites will monitor weather phenomena, such as typhoons, and detect seismic activity, allowing authorities to evacuate people and livestock in due time. In addition, if a disaster does occur, the satellites will provide analysts with data on the recovery time of affected areas. It is for these purposes that Myanmar has joined the "super-constellation" of nine Asian nations, including Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, to launch and monitor microsatellites, sharing technology and observational data.

The same Japanese universities working with Myanmar also helped the Philippines launch a satellite in 2016 that proved instrumental in detecting a disease in banana fields. However, the Philippine Space Development Act was only passed in December 2018. The bill provides a space development and utilization policy that will function as a strategic roadmap for future space development.

As for Thailand, however, in the early 2000s the country signed a bilateral agreement with France to co-develop the Thailand Earth Observation Satellite (Theos). Data from Theos has been used to map disputed areas between Cambodia and Thailand, monitor the area of agricultural crops, obtain updates on flooding situations and for various aspects of natural resource management. Theos-2, which was approved in 2017 and originally scheduled for launch in 2020, is expected to be put into orbit in 2022.

Further behind are Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei, while more ambitious is Vietnam. It was in fact a Vietnamese astronaut, Pham Tuân, who was the first Southeast Asian man to go into space in 1980. Vietnam, which announced in 2017 that it would produce its own satellite by 2022 and become "one of the region's leading countries in this field," is developing, in collaboration with Japan, two types of 600-kg radar-equipped satellites called LOTUSat-1 and LOTUSat-2 scheduled for launch in 2023.

But having the most advanced space program within ASEAN is Indonesia, having established the first national space agency in the ASEAN region in 1963, LAPAN. Given its location and geomorphological conditions, Indonesia has long recognized the importance of space technology to its development. Much of Indonesia's space program focuses on space communications applications, meteorological satellites, remote sensing satellites, and studies of the socioeconomic and legal aspects of space technology. In addition, in line with its national policy, Indonesia is working on its launch capabilities and other strategic technologies: the goal is self-sufficiency in space activities, coming to launch a satellite of its own production by 2040. Finally, the country is increasing its engagement in global space affairs, as demonstrated by its active participation in the Space Economy Leaders Meetings, a new format created in the G20 by Saudi Arabia and then inherited by Italy. 

Finally, Singapore's foray into space has been more recent than other ASEAN countries. However, given its financial and technological resources, Singapore has progressed rapidly. To date, it focuses primarily on the use of space technology for communications, resource control, and academic research. The city-state is actually building a talent pool with technical expertise in satellite technologies, with numerous university programs offering relevant courses. The Satellite Technology and Research Center (STAR) at National University Singapore, for example, offers courses for undergraduate and postgraduate students to train the workforce needed to make the country a leading edge in the spacecraft industry.

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